COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STORIX, INC.,

Plaintiff/Respondent,)

VS.

) FROM SAN DIEGO COUNTY) HON. KEVIN A. ENRIGHT

ANTHONY JOHNSON,

) COA NO. D075308

Defendant/ Cross-Complainant/) 37-2015-00034545-Appellant;

) SUPERIOR COURT NO.) CU-BT-CTL

DAVID HUFFMAN, et al.,

Defendants/ Cross-Defendants/ Respondents.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

Thursday, February 15, 2018

(Pages 2765 through 2938, Inclusive)

Volume 17

1100 Union Street, Department 904 San Diego, California

Reported By: Leyla S. Jones CSR No. 12750

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

ANTHONY JOHNSON and ROBIN SASSI, derivatively on behalf of STORIX, INC., <u>Hon. Kevin A. Enright</u> a California corporation,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

DAVID HUFFMAN, an individual; RICHARD TURNER, Case Nos.: 37-2016an individual; MANUEL ALTAMIRANO, an individual; and 37-2015-DAVID KINNEY, an individual; 00028262-CU-BT-CTL) DAVID SMILJKOVICH, an individual; and DOES 1-20,

CASE NO. 37-2015-00034545-CU-BT-CTL (Consolidated with 00030822-CU-MC-CTL

Defendants,

Trial, Day 12

STORIX, INC., a California corporation;

Nominal Defendant.

AND CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

(Pages 2765 through 2938, Inclusive)

Volume 17

February 15, 2018

9:03 a.m.

1100 Union Street, Dept. 904 San Diego, California

REPORTED BY:

Leyla S. Jones

CSR No. 12750

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1	INDEX OF WITNESSES
2	(None called.)
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4	INDEX TO EXHIBITS
5	(None marked or received.)
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SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA; 1 THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2018; 9:03 A.M. 2 3 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Good morning. Okay. And we're on the record. All counsel are 6 7 present. 8 My clerk was just asking on the false 9 imprisonment, the case number in its entirety is 10 dismissed; is that correct? 11 MR. KING: That is correct. 12 THE COURT: Yes. 13 THE CLERK: Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Let's do this. I'd like 14 15 the modified instructions now. I have the modified 16 verdict form. I asked for that while we were 17 waiting, Mr. King. So I have that, but I'd like the -- other modified instructions. I understand 18 19 some are on their way. 20 Did you modify any, Mr. King? 21 MR. KING: I did not get a chance to do 22 that, so I still got to modify the ones that we 23 discussed were mine. 24 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, then 25 let's do this. It's about 9:06. I want to start at 26 10:00, so I'm going to move pretty quickly, but I 27 wanted to start with the motion for directed

verdict. And the Court's read and considered the

defendants' motion and I've considered arguments.

And I had a question, Mr. King, on punitive damages. And I would like to -- the standard, as you know, is clear and convincing malice, oppression, or fraud. And if we look, for instance, at Mr. Kinney, I'm interested in knowing the evidence, clear and convincing, where he engaged in despicable conduct, malice, oppression, or fraud.

MR. KING: I think all of the defendants engaged --

THE COURT: And I know that's not an easy question, and you just got here.

MR. KING: It's easier than you think, actually. All the defendants -- and there's evidence -- engaged in fraudulent concealment. I think they all knew exactly --

THE COURT: No, and I'm not talking about the cause of action. I'm talking specifically about punitive damages. And fraud by concealment or fraud in any other form is different than the standard of clear and convincing malice, oppression, or fraud.

MR. KING: Yes, exactly. So I think
that -- I think that the standard is met for
fraudulent concealment. As far as individually for
each one having specific -- specific intent
necessary for punitive damages, I agree there might
be no specific evidence of Mr. Kinney being -- being
directly involved in that, but there was evidence

that all of them were updated and apprised of

Mr. Smiljkovich's activities that were going on as

they were working alongside Mr. Johnson when he

returned in 2013. They all knew about it. There's

evidence of that in the record. The claim is that

they intentionally concealed that from

Mr. Johnson --

THE COURT: So --

MR. KING: -- in order to induce
Mr. Johnson to --

THE COURT: And I understand the theory on the cause of action. But I wonder, based on what you just said -- you sued the defendants individually. There's a motion before me on a directed verdict on behalf of them. And I wonder about the despicable conduct that Mr. Kinney has engaged in. It doesn't, as you know, have to be despicable. It can be malice. It can be oppression or fraud.

MR. KING: I think the entirety of the conduct is -- what the defendants did to Mr. Johnson is despicable. I think that does meet the standard. And I think that these -- there's plenty of evidence that indicates every one of these guys, regardless of how active their role was, were all in agreement on this, that they were going to act as one block. And they have consistently.

THE COURT: Okay. Then maybe there's a

conspiracy, but -- okay. Tell me as to Mr. Huffman the malice, oppression, or fraud proven by you by a clear and convincing standard. In other words, have you met the burden to show that Mr. Huffman engaged, by clear and convincing evidence, punitive damage appropriate conduct.

MR. KING: I look at the facts in the case.

I see someone who trusted 60 percent of their company with four specific individuals, and Mr. Huffman was at the helm of that. And what -- what transpired, the way that Mr. Johnson was treated and then shut out, I think that's despicable in and of itself. That offends me.

THE COURT: And tell me -- now, anger and frustration is not the standard, and what may be despicable to you may not be the legal standard.

I'm not saying you need to concede, but I guess I am thinking about this.

I am wondering -- in other words, give me your best shot as to how you've met the standard on punitive damages against any one of the individual defendants. Not talking about Storix, not talking about anything other than what did Huffman do? What did Turner do? And I'm not talking about the causes of action.

MR. KING: When Mr. Johnson returned, they had him working on a separate -- essentially a project on his own by himself. When he asked for

help, they said no. When he finally -- when it finally -- you know, he got so frustrated that they came to argument about it, they told him, "We don't even want what you're doing. No one wants it."

They let him -- they let him work by himself in a corner on what he thought was something really important, and then they tell him, "We don't want it." Turner and Huffman, that's what led Mr. Johnson to resign.

And then they say, "Well, we'd love to have you back. We want you here." Johnson sends e-mails back, goes back to Mr. Altamirano back and forth.

Before there's any condition, before there's any demands, he says, "I want to meet. Let's talk about it." No. Done. There's no more place for you here. That's malicious. It's malicious because it was -- it was now -- now they are in control.

They're the boss and they get to be -- they get to be the dictator now.

THE COURT: Evidence of malice, oppression, or fraud? I mean, I recognize personalities. I recognize disagreements. I recognize vehement disagreement by technical people doing very specific things. But what I'm looking for is legal standard, clear and convincing evidence, despicable conduct.

Now, fraud smacks of that. But fraud, cause of action, preponderance of the evidence, I would suggest is different than fraud by clear and

convincing evidence or malice or oppression.

MR. KING: So --

THE COURT: And we throw these words around easily, but I wonder has the legal standard been met on the issues before me on the directed verdict.

MR. KING: So it's interesting because the breach of a fiduciary duty in a majority/minority shareholder conference is often referred to as shareholder oppression.

So when you have the majority denying minority members things that they're entitled to, breaching their -- using their power, their control, for their own benefit to the detriment of the minority, that's defined as oppression.

Now, I don't know exactly how the punitive damages' definition of oppression differs from that. But the ultimate -- I guess the highest best case we have for despicable conduct is this. And this is the -- this is the best case we can make for it -- is that -- you look at the evidence and you say, okay, not only did these guys not disclose going after a buy-sell agreement, not only did they not disclose that they were pursuing a loan to purchase shares pursuant to a buy-sell agreement or something like that, but they actually had a plan to induce Mr. Johnson to return to work, enact a buy-sell agreement or lull him into agreeing to a buy-sell agreement so that when he returned, he would be

subject to it, and then fire or cause him to resign or terminate his employment with the intent that then he would have to sell or forfeit his shares.

Now, that ultimately was never consummated, but that -- I think you can look at the evidence and say that's what happened. I think that meets the standard for punitive damages.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Aveni?

MR. AVENI: Thank you, Your Honor. Let me address each of the points I heard from Mr. King.

THE COURT: Well, let me -- I'm ready to rule.

MR. AVENI: Oh.

THE COURT: But I want to let everybody be heard. So when you say each of the points, I want to start at 10:00, and we've got a lot to talk about on the instructions.

MR. AVENI: I'll defer to you, Your Honor, unless you want to hear from me.

THE COURT: With regard to this, the directed verdict is directed to all the causes of action of the cross-complaint, as well as punitive damages.

And with regard to this, the Court's ruling is -- well, the standard for the Court is the directed verdict may be granted only when disregarding conflicting evidence giving the evidence of a party against him the motion is

directed all the value to which it is legally entitled and indulging in every legitimate inference when such evidence in favor of that party -- the Court nonetheless determines that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support the claim or defense of the party opposing the motion or a verdict in favor of that party.

The Court finds that that standard has not been met with regard to the fraud causes of action against the defendants. That standard has not been met with regard to the breach of fiduciary cause of action against the defendants. That standard has not been met, although it's obviously -- the conspiracy -- civil conspiracy cause of action is obviously reliant on the underlying cause of action. That standard has not been met, but it has been met on the punitive damages against all individual defendants.

And so the Court grants the motion as to punitive damages, denies as to the balance of the motion on directed verdict. So that will be the ruling. And that means that 3941 and 3942 will not be given by the Court, and we'll show that as being refused.

I'd like to go through the -- all the modified instructions, and I want to say before we get to that that I appreciate counsel staying late last night and staff and going through these

1 instructions and the verdict form. And I know we 2 had a lot of discussions. And as I promised, I 3 would let everybody put their positions on the 4 record this morning. 5 But what I'd like to do is this. I'd like 6 to go through my notes, and there's a lot of 7 instructions we need to talk about and I want to see 8 where we -- where we are after -- after our 9 conference, any further thinking, any further 10 argument -- and we are on the record -- with regard 11 to this. 12 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Your Honor, may I interrupt 13 just for a moment? 14 THE COURT: Yes. 15 MR. MCCLOSKEY: We -- I have retrieved the 16 sanitized jury instructions, to the extent that may 17 help you with your discussion right now. 18 THE COURT: Yes, it does. Thank you. 19 And, Mr. Sullivan, I have all of yours? 20 MR. SULLIVAN: I believe so, the corrected 21 ones we discussed yesterday. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Now, let me 23 ask --24 Oh, this is a full set, Mr. McCloskey? 25 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honor, with the

THE COURT: Okay. We're going to need

exception of Mr. King's instructions. We haven't

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received those.

those, obviously, pretty quickly. Are they on their 1 2 way, Mr. King? You have them now? 3 MR. KING: I do not have them now. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Do you need to make a 5 call, or are they on their way? Or we're going 6 to -- I just assume not kind of cut and paste 7 through this process now. 8 MR. KING: I have to just -- I started 9 them. I have to take a look at them. And then once 10 they're done, I can e-mail them to Robin or have 11 them printed out. 12 THE COURT: Do you have an ETA? 13 MR. KING: Ten minutes. 14 THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's fine. 15 I want to start argument with all the instructions in place. Okay. Let me -- I'm going to do this 16 17 going to -- well, have you seen their modified? 18 MR. KING: I've seen their modified special 19 verdict. THE COURT: What about instructions? 20 21 MR. KING: I just was looking at those. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's -- let's 23 start with 3700, because that is important as to how 24 we're going to do this. Does everyone agree to 3700 25 as modified? 26 MR. MCCLOSKEY: We sent these to Mr. King 27 last night, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ready? Ready? The only thing

I would say on 3700 is we really need to define "agency and/or agent." And when it says "corporation may authorize," what I'm reallying look for is "corporation acts."

MR. AVENI: Acts, Your Honor?

THE COURT: In other words, corporation is not just a thing. It's operated by people. People make decisions. People act or don't act. And this is "may authorize." That's clear. But what I really want is -- well, how does Storix do stuff? And it is a little bit different, because you have the corporation and the individual defendants.

And so what I'm thinking is a corporation acts through -- and I don't know how you want to do this, but we could say directors, officers, or employees. And that's probably maybe all we need. Once we get into agency, I think we need to define it. And I'm not sure it's an issue. That's why I asked for this. And then this determines what -- well, it has an effect on 3602.

MR. KING: I've seen the 3700. I have no objection to the way -- they phrased it as being --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me just say that -- ask that.

And I know I'm interrupting, Mr. King.

But if you're all in agreement as to this version, then that's fine. The only thing I'm wondering about is what I said. And if no one's

1 concerned about it and I'm the only one concerned 2 about it then I withdraw my concern. If everybody 3 is in agreement with this 3700, I'm fine. 4 MR. SULLIVAN: I haven't had a chance to 5 review it, so --THE COURT: Okay. Everybody we --6 7 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Can we go over it just once 8 more, Your Honor? I think we can do this off the 9 record. Can you give me what it is that you're 10 proposing? 11 THE COURT: Well, Mr. King's not objecting. 12 And so the way it reads is, "A corporation may 13 authorize directors, officers, or employees to act on its behalf." 14 15 MR. MCCLOSKEY: We're fine with that, 16 Your Honor. THE COURT: "This relationship is called 17 18 'agency.' The one giving the authority is call the 19 'principal.' The person to whom who authority is 20 given is called the 'agent.'" 21 MR. MCCLOSKEY: We're fine with that, 22 Your Honor. 23 MR. SULLIVAN: No objection, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Then I'll give 3700. 25 Thank you. Let's go back then to 3602, and it's 26 actually -- oh, it's following 3700. My feeling in

looking at the use note is that it does not apply,

because the issue there is conspiring with the

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1 entity. And there -- there's no allegation that 2 that's the case. 3 Am I correct, Mr. King? 4 MR. KING: That is correct. Absolutely. 5 THE COURT: I mean, they're conspiring among themselves, as I understand it. 6 7 MR. KING: Yes. 8 THE COURT: So if that's true, I don't 9 think 3602 applies, and I can read you the first sentences and the directions for use. "This 10 11 instruction is for use if an individual defendant is 12 alleged to have conspired with an entity." And that 13 allegation is not made. 14 Now, maybe there's inferences. Maybe 15 there's implications, maybe, and inferences drawn, but I don't think 3602 applies. 16 But I offer this 17 and I offer you to speak and say I'm wrong or --18 MR. MCCLOSKEY: I think you're right, 19 Your Honor. Withdraw. 20 THE COURT: All right. We'll show --21 Mr. Sullivan, is that fine? 22 MR. SULLIVAN: That's fine with me, 23 Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Well, I guess it doesn't really 25 affect you. All right. We'll show it's withdrawn. 26 And by the way, is 8 withdrawn, Special 8? That's 27 the standing lack of authority.

MR. KING: Yes. Actually, I'd like to have

it as refused, but --1 2 THE COURT: Okay. That's why I had it in 3 the refused pile. I was thinking -- okay. We'll 4 show it as refused. 5 Then -- all right. Then I want to look at the modifications to 4102 and 4103. Are we --6 7 MR. SULLIVAN: So I modified 4102 with 8 respect to Storix's claims and I included two versions of 4103. The CACI on 4102 does have a 9 10 blank where it says, "Insert description of conduct 11 alleged to violate the duty of loyalty." 12 But on the duty of confidentiality, it 13 doesn't have that same block for insertion. So the 14 preference would be to have it has originally 15 drafted consistent with CACI. I have included an 16 alternative instruction that has a further 17 description of confidential information. 18 THE COURT: Okay. I think the difficulty 19 with 4103 was the addition of "to the detriment of 20 Storix" --21 MR. SULLIVAN: 22 THE COURT: -- as I recall. 23 MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, okay. 24 THE COURT: Is that correct? 25 MR. KING: That's correct. 26 THE COURT: So my feeling is to -- well --

MR. SULLIVAN:

I have no objection to that.

THE COURT: Okay. So what I'll do --

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MR. SULLIVAN: I must have misstated in my 1 2 notes what was required to be modified. 3 THE COURT: Okay. I have two. One is 4 shorter than the other one. 5 MR. SULLIVAN: The shorter one is the preferred one. It should be the -- the Post-it note 6 7 that says original. 8 THE COURT: Okay. And I don't have any 9 Post-it notes on this, but I'm looking at -- Element 10 2 is shorter than Element 2 on the alternative. 11 MR. SULLIVAN: Correct. That should be 12 the --13 THE COURT: Okay. I'll do that. I'll strike "or to the detriment of Storix, Inc." 14 15 Agreed? 16 MR. KING: Yes. 17 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Agreed. THE COURT: Then going back to 4102, 18 19 everybody in agreement? 20 MR. KING: So my -- my concern is that the 21 "in connection with" language assumes facts that 22 are, I think, you know, obviously in dispute. So in 23 the -- if you look at Number 2, the first paragraph, 24 it says, "In connection with his efforts in pursuit 25 of Janstor Technology." No objection to that part. 26 And then it says, "And related acts in

furtherance of his intent to compete with Storix,

That's -- that's a factual issue that's in

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1 dispute. Now, perhaps there's a way we could say 2 something --3 THE COURT: Well, Storix has to prove it. 4 These are the elements Storix has to prove --5 MR. KING: Right. THE COURT: -- on loyalty. CACI says 6 7 insert one of the following, and we've got four on 8 Element 2. 9 MR. SULLIVAN: Correct. 10 THE COURT: So do we want to do one or --11 MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I think they're 12 perhaps different bases of violations of duty of 13 loyalty. 14 THE COURT: So the way CACI reads is you're 15 either knowingly acting against or you're acting on 16 behalf, et cetera. And they're not alternative. 17 It's pick one. And if you're all in agreement with 18 the way it is now, that's fine. Or if you are not, 19 let me know. 20 So I guess, Mr. King, your thoughts? 21 MR. KING: I agree. I think -- well --22 MR. SULLIVAN: There will be two 4102s 23 rather than trying to deal with a single 24 instruction. That was what we were trying to avoid, 25 I think, with including more. 26 THE COURT: Now, why two? Because Johnson

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I'm trying to pull up

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breach of fiduciary duty?

with respect to the acts that are identified in

Number 2 that are violative of the duty and whether

or not the instruction anticipates including only

one description or multiple.

I'm looking at the notes on the master sheet here. Element 2 requires defendant knowingly act against Plaintiff interests, quote, in connection with -- and then it says "description of transaction." And so we need to describe the transaction, but I'm wondering if we need four alternatives, as opposed to pick one.

MR. SULLIVAN: So I think on the one hand, you have the Janstor and related efforts. On the other hand, you have breach of loyalty related to, you know, contacting customers, which may be related to that effort or it may be independent, an independent breach, similar with contacting Mr. Bonert, an employee of Storix, and seeking to settle discord within the employment force of the company. I don't know necessarily if that were related to Janstor. So if we were to limit it to efforts made to Janstor, we're kind of excising other acts that were violated.

THE COURT: All right. So if we include those two as alternatives, will that do it? There's four here. I think three and four can be combined.

MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah, and probably one and 1 2 two can be combined two, because they both relate to 3 Janstor. 4 THE COURT: Can we do that then? 5 MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah. THE COURT: If we did that, Mr. King, is 6 7 that okay? 8 MR. KING: I think so. 9 THE COURT: And I think it would be "and/or." I don't like "and/or." It's really "or." 10 11 It's really an alternative. 12 MR. SULLIVAN: I could do "or." 13 THE COURT: All right. Then do "or," and 14 then modify that so instead of four, we have two. 15 And if you can do that pretty quickly, obviously. I want the instructions in place before we argue. 16 17 Okay? Thank you. 18 And that would be agreeable in theory, 19 Mr. King? 20 MR. KING: Yes. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. Going to unjust 22 enrichment, positions? I know counsel were going to 23 think about it further and do research. 24 MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, Your Honor. In fact, I 25 had a chance to look at -- a limited chance to look 26 at some cases. And I think your initial question 27 was whether or not it perhaps is a separate cause of

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action or a remedy.

And the Melchior vs. New Line Production case, 106 Cal.App.4th 779, says unjust enrichment is not as a cause of action. California is, instead, synonomous with the circumstances in which a plaintiff is entitled to restitution as a remedy.

There's also cases that allow the question of unjust enrichment despite someone having an equitable origin or nature being submitted to the jury, including breach of fiduciary duty cases.

We saw that the proposed CACI instruction doesn't actually include the misappropriation of trade secret series, but there are cases allowing that question to be submitted to the jury on breach of fiduciary duty. I do have a short brief addressing some of these authorities if Your Honor's interested.

THE COURT: Well, I'm obviously interested. The question is time.

MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah, I understand that.

THE COURT: We don't have the luxury of time, necessarily. But if you want to submit it and file it, I'll consider that. And a copy to Mr. King.

MR. SULLIVAN: Sure.

THE COURT: Mr. King, your position?

MR. KING: It's an equitable remedy.

Restitution, that's something for the Court to decide.

THE COURT: And my concern was not so much cause of action as it was legal or equitable. And we talked about it last night. The fact that it's in CACI means maybe it's legal, but that's in a specific area of CACI; namely, trade secrets.

Here's -- a thought is to -- and I recognize we've talked a lot about this. But in thinking about it, my thought is to let it go to the jury and we can then later, with the luxury of time, if there's a finding on it, we can talk about whether that's an appropriate question for the jury.

But in any event, the Court is in a position, regardless, to consider it as advisory only. And so that's -- that's kind of my thinking, at least as it stands now.

But I wanted to get, Mr. King, your -In other words, so I -- I'm not saying it's
a separate cause of action, but it is a form of
restitution.

MR. SULLIVAN: Sure.

THE COURT: And restitution, to me, is equity.

MR. SULLIVAN: In the Court of Appeals in -- American Master Lease, LLC, vs. Idanta Partners, 225 Cal.App.4th 1451, actually was addressing a breach -- aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary claim and talked about at length that the jury was provided the question of enrichment.

That case actually reversed and remanded the instructions that were provided, not because they were improperly submitted to the jury, but there were problems with the calculations performed, but it remanded for a jury trial.

And in discussing, it noted that Plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on claim for unjust enrichment seeking restitution and money unjustly retained, citing Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank case, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, and Holson v. Dillely (phonetic), a Northern District of Illinois case from 1998, noting that the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the jury. That's on the page 2 of the brief I submitted.

And that the -- pages 3 through 5 of the brief are a recitation of several of the authorities that were addressed in Storix's opposition to Mr. Johnson's summary judgment motion addressing that unjust enrichment is a proper remedy in breach of fiduciary duty cases. And it looks to the benefit -- profit or benefit that the defendant obtained in breaching the duty, regardless of any detriment suffered by the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Mr. King?

MR. KING: There's a good reason why unjust enrichment would be a different scenario than trade secrets. Because once you have a trade secret, once you know of a trade secret, it makes sense that you

can't just forget it. There's less of an equitable concern.

In other context -- and I think it is reflected in CACI by the fact that there's no other unjust enrichment instruction mentioned on any other series of causes of action -- unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy.

about that. I think I was one who raised it last night. But I guess I'm wondering, in light of the brief and looking at the brief, what Mr. Sullivan is citing. In other words, in a breach of fiduciary duty, it's appropriate to have it to go to the jury, CACI cited. Mr. -- that was remanded.

Mr. Sullivan, is it Meister (phonetic?).

MR. SULLIVAN: American Master Lease. I have a copy of it if you'd like.

THE COURT: Okay. American Master Lease was remanded for a jury trial on the issue of unjust enrichment in a breach of fiduciary duty context.

MR. KING: The concern -- the concern I have with this is that the case that's cited, at least in the block text, is -- it says, "Defendants do not argue, however, the trial Court erred by submitting the issue of unjust enrichment to the jury."

THE COURT: Which means everyone agreed.

MR. KING: Right. Which means the decision

and comments about whether or not it was a jury issue are not really before the Court, not central to its holding.

MR. SULLIVAN: Of course the Lectrodryer case cited in that case and then quoted below in the next paragraph, quote, SeoulBank's assertion that the case, nonetheless, should have been tried to the Court because the claim required the application of equitable principles is thus -- (inaudible).

THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. We can't hear you.

MR. SULLIVAN: And then Lectrodryer had a right it a jury trial, and the jury's unanimous verdict work was not merely advisory.

MR. KING: It was -- Lectrodryer was -- was that -- sorry. I'll look it up.

THE COURT: No. Go ahead.

MR. KING: I mean, my question about

Lectrodryer is I don't know what the context -- if

that's misappropriation of trade secrets, if that

was also a breach of fiduciary duty. I'm not sure

how that arose.

THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN: I don't recall the specific facts of that case right now, but it would seem that we're talking about a particular remedy. And if the Court is treating that remedy as available, then largely, the basis for the liability is irrelevant

whether or not it's a jury question.

I think the cases that talk about whether or not it's an equitable question for the Court or perhaps a mixed equitable legal issue for the jury focus on the relief in how you calculate it.

In this case, we have unrebutted testimony from Mr. Bergmark on how you can go about calculating what the unjust enrichment was. So this is not a situation where the jury might be looking at other factors that would make it more equitable in nature, and there's a unrebutted valuation of software that Mr. Johnson obtained.

THE COURT: Well, does anyone disagree with the concept that -- let's assume it's equitable. I mean, it's a form of restitution, which is equitable. But in light of the authority cited in Mr. Sullivan's brief, in looking at that and reading that, I guess I am wondering about the concept of treating it either as the jury finding, one, or, two, the jury finding in an advisory capacity only. In other words, the Court -- and that means the Court can reject it. The Court can accept it. In other words, the jury is advising the Court. And I -- so I'm wondering about the concept of --

Let's say, Mr. King, you're right. Then do you disagree with the concept that the Court can treat it as an advisory-only opinion?

MR. KING: I don't. In fact, the Court can

2793 1 do that with -- I believe the Court has the 2 discretion to do that in any nonjury case if the 3 Court wants to. 4 THE COURT: Well, I don't know that I'd 5 submit an injunction. 6 MR. KING: That's true. 7 THE COURT: But I understand what you're 8 saying. MR. KING: Ultimately, the decision is 9 10 yours. 11 THE COURT: Okay. So let's do this then. 12 We'll show over objection, I'm giving 4410. 13 it's been modified from CACI, because that's a trade secret instruction. On the language of 4410 as 14 15 submitted, I'll give it over objection. But I want 16 to make sure there's no disagreement on the language, assuming I'm giving it. And just so you 17 18 know, I'm going to be giving it out of the 19 instructions I just received this morning, the new 20 complete set, so everybody knows. 21 MR. SULLIVAN: I don't believe it was 22 modified further after last night. 23 THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. King, any --24 MR. SULLIVAN: Actually, I think I did 25 modify it to take out the reference to Janstor.

THE COURT: I think that's --MR. KING: The second paragraph, not really an objection so much as I'm a little bit unclear on

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27

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1
     the language. In the second sentence, "It says
 2
     first determine the value of benefit Anthony Johnson
 3
     would not have been achieved except for his breach
 4
     of fiduciary duty." I suspect they're --
 5
              MR. SULLIVAN: On the then maybe -- would
     not have achieved -- gotcha.
 6
 7
              MR. KING: Okay.
 8
              THE COURT: What?
 9
              MR. SULLIVAN: I think there's an extra
     word in there. "Would not have been achieved"
10
11
     should be would have -- "would have achieved."
12
              THE COURT: No. That's right out of CACI.
13
     My preference is to use CACI.
14
              MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. That's fine.
15
              THE COURT: All right. Anything else,
16
     Mr. King, on that?
17
              MR. KING: No.
18
              THE COURT: Okay. Then -- all right --
19
              MR. KING: And --
20
              THE COURT: Go ahead.
21
              MR. KING: I just sent the special -- the
22
     revised majority shareholder fiduciary duty
23
     instruction that we discussed last night with
     redactions, and I copied counsel on it.
24
25
              THE COURT: Okay. Is that Number 3?
26
              MR. KING: It was -- it was marked
27
     originally as 4400, Version 2, or the second 4400.
28
              THE COURT: Oh, that's right.
```

```
MR. KING: And so I just have it now as
 1
 2
     majority shareholder fiduciary duties.
 3
              THE COURT: In other words, it would --
            It's 4100 modified?
 4
     okay.
              MR. KING: Yes.
 5
              THE COURT: And everyone in agreement or
 6
 7
     have you seen it?
 8
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: I think he just sent it.
 9
              MR. KING: You can take a look at my --
10
              THE COURT: Well, that was a second ago.
11
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: I'm sorry.
12
              THE COURT: That was a second ago, so
     you --
13
14
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: I know I'm behind the time,
15
     Your Honor.
16
              THE COURT: I'm kidding.
17
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: I'm sorry about being slow.
18
              THE COURT: So can we print out what
19
     Mr. King has sent so that they can see it?
20
              THE CLERK: I don't see it.
21
              THE COURT: Okay. She hasn't received it
22
     yet. Now, any preference on where I get the
23
     specials in terms of order? I don't want to give
24
     them after I give the 5000 series. While we're
25
     waiting, I'm looking at Special 2 and Special 4.
26
              Any objection to those, Mr. King?
27
              These are modified in accordance with our
28
     discussion, Mr. McCloskey?
```

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. KING: I mean, the same objection I had last night. The Court's already ruled on it, so nothing else.

Special 2. And I think the objection on Number 2 was there were dueling versions. And Mr. King's request on his version was to add language after "business decision," quote, "in their capacity as directors," end quote. The Court has deleted that over objection. I'm going to give the version -- because I think it's redundant because it's clearly talking about the directors of the corporation, which follows the proposed language. And that's in the version that I have before me.

So I'm going to give -- I think there's agreement to give 2. It's a question of whether we're going to add, quote, "in their capacity as directors." And the Court is overruling or is not going to give that, and so the Court's going to give the version that's submitted without that language.

Is that a fair recitation?

MR. KING: Yes.

THE COURT: Then on 4, this was quite lengthy and the Court asked that it be modified, take out references to 317(e) and (g), which has been done, and also delete references to any other Corporation Code section and that's been done.

1 So any objection to 4?

MR. KING: Same objection I had last night, which is I think that bylaws control on this issue. Mentioning that portion of the code which has been restricted by more specific requirements in the bylaws is -- it's going to mislead the jury into thinking that that's a third option or a third way of approving advancement above and beyond what the bylaws have already restricted.

THE COURT: Well, I'll summarize. The discussion that we had was -- that concern is expressed by Mr. King. Mr. McCloskey view was this gives stamp of approval to the bylaws.

No one is arguing that Special

Instruction 4 is what controls this factual

scenario. You're both going to argue that it's the

bylaws, and you're all going to argue that it's the

bylaws; am I right?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So just, as I say, it's in the form of a stamp of approval. I don't think they'll be confusing to the jury with regard to it in light of everyone agreeing that the bylaws language controlled. So the Court will give 2 over objection.

Now, the question comes up, where do you want me to give it? And thoughts there?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: That's a great question,

```
1
     Your Honor. Let me --
 2
              THE COURT: Well, let me do this, just to
     make it easy. I'll give it in front of 2513. I'll
 3
 4
     give both.
 5
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: You'll give --
 6
              THE COURT: After out-of-pocket damages.
 7
     And the title has been deleted, so it just says 1923
     damages.
 8
 9
              Is that agreeable, Mr. King, on 1923?
10
              MR. KING: Yes.
              THE COURT: All right. So between 1923 and
11
12
     what I -- it will follow that. Is that agreed?
13
              MR. KING: Yes.
14
              THE COURT: Two and four. Is that fine?
15
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: I don't want to give it after
16
17
     the 5000 series.
18
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Agree?
19
              THE COURT: Okay. Then with regard to --
20
     do we have the modification yet?
21
              MR. KING: You know what? It just said it
22
     went through.
23
              MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah, I just got it.
24
              THE COURT: Okay. So of all the specials,
25
     is it correct that we're giving just 2 and 4?
26
     Others were withdrawn, refused. We're giving 1?
27
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: I think we're giving 1.
28
              THE COURT: I don't know that I have 1.
                                                        Ι
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1
     don't have 1 in the new packet. Okay. I misspoke.
2
     I do have 1.
 3
              Any objection to 1, Mr. King?
 4
              MR. KING: No objection to 1.
5
              THE COURT: All right. I'll give 1. I
     don't have 3, though.
 6
7
              MR. AVENI: We withdrew that.
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: We withdrew it, Your Honor.
8
9
              THE COURT: Okay. That explains that.
     I've got 2 and 4. I think 5 and 6 were withdrawn.
10
     And I think 8 was refused.
11
12
              With regard to 8, we had a discussion about
13
     that and a brief filed by Mr. Sullivan. And I think
     after the discussion --
14
15
              Well, why don't you state it instead of me
16
     stating it, Mr. King, on standing authority. This
17
     is -- this is Number 8. Because I'm showing it's
     refused, and I want there to be a record of why it's
18
19
     refused.
20
              MR. KING: Yeah. I -- I think that the
     arguments have been made. I think that the --
21
22
              THE COURT: And they were made last night.
23
     I just want to put something on the record as to
24
     your position.
              MR. KING: Yeah. My position is that that
25
     instruction should go forward. But on -- that's my
26
27
     position, and the instruction has been refused,
28
     so --
```

THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Sullivan, why 1 2 don't you put your position on? I just want there 3 to be --4 MR. SULLIVAN: Understood. 5 THE COURT: -- a record as to why it was refused, even though we had this discussion last 6 7 night. 8 MR. SULLIVAN: Sure. Very briefly, 9 Your Honor, Storix's position is that the proposed instruction is not truly a standing issue. Standing 10 11 is whether or not Storix is the real party in interest that suffered the harm it's seeking to 12 address for in this action. That issue was 13 determined at the demurrer phase, and the objection 14 15 was overruled twice on demurrer. 16 The issue is really as to lack of 17 authority, essentially, lack of capacity to come 18 into Court. That would be a complete abatement, 19 which is a defense that's waived if not raised at 20 the first opportunity. It's never been pled before, 21 and the authorities cited in the brief discuss that. 22 THE COURT: All right. And with regard to 23 this, the -- we had a lengthy discussion, and the 24 discussion was -- I believe we reached somewhat of a 25 consensus. But with regard to --26 MR. KING: Actually, that's correct. 27 you want me to -- because I do recall that. I think

we said that it was probably -- that this was -- I

```
1
     think the argument was this was probably an issue of
2
     law, because there's no -- not a -- disputed facts,
 3
     and whatever the issue is an issue for the Court.
     My position is that it should go forward, but I
 4
5
     understand.
              THE COURT: Okay. And it was the question
 6
7
             In the scenario that is presented to the
     of law.
     Court here -- and that, is it's undisputed what the
8
     facts are -- the interpretation of the facts is
 9
     subject to dispute. But the facts are that three of
10
11
     the directors of five, the majority, in other words,
12
     voted to proceed on the lawsuit against, at that
     time, Janstor and Mr. Johnson.
13
14
              And on those undisputed facts, the thought
15
     was and my thought is that that is a question of
16
     law, not for the jury. And so for that reason, as
17
     well as everything else that's been stated by both
18
     sides, the Court is going to refuse Number 8.
                                                     Thank
19
     you.
20
              Then Number 7, I'm looking at my notes and
21
     I'm wondering -- was that withdrawn?
22
              MR. KING: And so just briefly --
23
              THE COURT: Yes.
24
              MR. KING: -- we -- I would just like to
25
     raise that issue if it -- as a -- and I can actually
26
     withdraw. We can put it in that we're withdrawing
27
     that special instruction and just dispense with it,
```

28

the one about --

THE COURT: Eight? 1 2 MR. KING: Yes. 3 THE COURT: You don't have to do that. 4 just want there to be a record of why I'm refusing. 5 MR. KING: Right, right. So what I'd like to do is also just make an oral motion for directed 6 7 verdict on that, because undisputed facts, legal issue, and have that on the record. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. So you're moving --10 MR. KING: Oral -- moving to have a 11 directed verdict against Storix's claim against 12 Mr. Johnson on the grounds that the corporation did 13 not properly authorize the filing of that lawsuit or properly ratify it with a majority vote of 14 15 disinterested directors. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan? 17 MR. SULLIVAN: I'm not sure if that's a 18 motion on standing grounds or this unpled lack of 19 authority events. If it's unstanding -- for the 20 reasons stating in the brief, it's not a standing 21 issue. 22 And to the extent that it is, the facts 23 establish that there was a vote of disinterested 24 directors. None of the directors voting in favor of 25 the action were interested in the action. Thev're 26 not parties, no financial interest in it. 27 from Mr. Walt what a materially interested director

requires. That standard is not met here, so there

28

1 was authority for it.

with actual implied or apparent authority to pursue litigation on behalf of the company. Mr. Johnson, as president of the company, had previously, on numerous occasions, instituted litigation as the president without a board vote. So there's authority there.

Further, there's a subsequent ratification in by disinterested directors who had no financial stake in the Janstor action itself. It might have been countersued, but that does not mean they have a material financial interest in the Janstor action. That ratification is retroactive and authorized the corporation at a formal noticed board meeting.

So any one of those scenarios would provide the authority for the corporation to pursue its action. And to the extent that this is truly a lack-of-authority defense, it was waived by never being pled.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. King?

MR. KING: The issue has been around in this case from the very beginning, and it was argued exhaustively and in a detail in our motion for summary judgment, which was denied. The Court found factual issues.

But with respect to the initial authorization, it had to be -- it always had to be

authorized by a majority vote of disinterested directors.

Now, yes, presidents can authorize litigation if it's in the ordinary course of business. Now, a lawsuit against a 40 percent shareholder, of a director, that's an extraordinary event and something that requires board approval, and that didn't happen before a lawsuit was filed.

The attempt to rectify that was May of 2017, a shareholder meeting where there was a vote to ratify that. And the directors voting in favor of it, the three that were opposing Mr. Johnson and Sassi, were not disinterested because at that point they are now in a consolidated action against Mr. Johnson. They have a financial interest, material financial interest, in having that lawsuit go forward.

More importantly, though, is that if they authorize the filing of that lawsuit without proper authority, at that point, now that they're ratifying their prior action to spend corporate money on this lawsuit, they have a financial interest in protecting themselves from unauthorized expenditure of corporate funds previously. They're materially interested in that vote.

MR. SULLIVAN: There's been no contrary evidence, no conflicting expert opinions, on that issue. The corporations can always ratify. If it

was truly an issue of standing, then the standing 1 2 would have been assessed at the time. Ratification 3 wouldn't be an issue. That's why it's not an issue 4 of standing. It's a issue of authority, and 5 ratification cures that to the extent there was a defect, which there wasn't, given the facts in this 6 7 case, which clearly, there was authority for, to the extent it was necessary at all. 8 9 THE COURT: Anything else? 10 MR. KING: I think you got it. 11 THE COURT: All right. Citing to the same 12 standard that I earlier cited to on directed verdict, that standard has not been met. So that --13 the directed verdict on behalf of Mr. Johnson with 14 15 regard to the standing/lack of authority to sue is 16 denied. 17 And for all the same reasons, the Court 18 refuses to give -- all the same reasons previously 19 referenced, the Court refuses to give Special 20 Instruction Number 8. 21 And I know you said you can withdraw it, 22 but I'll leave it in the refused in light of the 23 status. Okay. 24 MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, just going back, 25 I don't know that we made a record today, but we did 26 discuss it yesterday -- was -- Storix's request that

it be allowed to have instructions on punitive

damages according to proof at trial, which were

27

28

1 subject to a motion to strike by Judge Trapp early 2 on without leave to amend. We discussed that yesterday, and the request was denied. I just want 3 4 to make sure we have that on record. 5 THE COURT: All right. And it is denied. As I mentioned, I think it's a matter -- this is 6 7 Storix's claim for punitive damages against Johnson. 8 MR. SULLIVAN: Correct. 9 THE COURT: I think there's a due process 10 issue at this point if I was to reinstate, and I 11 recognize that counsel have previously litigated 12 this before Judge Trapp and she did not allow the 13 punitive damages to go forward on behalf of Storix. 14 And the Court is going to standby that decision. 15 Nothing in the trial has changed my view of that, 16 and so the Court will not allow punitive damages to 17 go forward. As it turns out, neither side is going 18 to be allowed to pursue any punitive damages against 19 the other, despite the level of frustration and 20 anger, which is not the standard, as I said. 21 Okay. Do we have those instructions? 22 MR. MCCLOSKEY: One last thing, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Yes. 24 MR. MCCLOSKEY: The revised shareholder 25 fiduciary duty instruction that Mr. King just 26 sent --27 THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: -- we have no issues with

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1
          It's an issue now of location in the jury
     it.
 2
     instructions, and I would suggest that it replace
     4100 and the modified 4100 that we talked about
 3
 4
     yesterday.
 5
              THE COURT: In other words, following 4100?
 6
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Instead of 4100,
 7
     Your Honor.
 8
              THE COURT: In other words, not give CACI
     4100?
 9
10
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: No. I think we were going
11
     to do that yesterday. It was -- no. It was right
12
     after 4100, CACI. That's right. I'm sorry.
13
              THE COURT: But the language as modified by
14
     Mr. King is agreeable?
15
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honor, so it
16
     comes right after 4100.
17
              THE COURT: And, Mr. Sullivan, agreeable?
18
              MR. SULLIVAN: That's fine, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: And thank you, Mr. King, for
19
20
     doing that. I'll give it right after 4100.
21
              I have a modified 4103. Is that in
22
     agreement?
23
              MR. KING: Yes.
24
              THE COURT: What that does is delete the
25
     language of "to the detriment of Storix."
26
              So anything else, Mr. Sullivan, on that?
27
     In other words, we had a discussion.
28
              MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, correct.
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THE COURT: Is this mod- --
1
2
              MR. SULLIVAN: That's the modification I
3
     made and e-mailed to Robin.
 4
              THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. All right.
     Now, it's a little bit after 10 o'clock. Are there
5
 6
     any other instructions --
7
              MR. SULLIVAN: Was Special 7 addressed?
8
     I'm told it's in there, so.
 9
              THE COURT: Now, I don't have Special 7.
10
              MR. SULLIVAN: That's the one with
11
     economical damages and nominal damages. It should
12
     be after 3900.
13
              THE COURT: Okay. Was it listed by number?
              MR. SULLIVAN: It should --
14
15
              THE COURT: Yes, it's 3902 as modified.
16
              In agreement, Mr. King?
17
              MR. KING: Yes.
18
              THE COURT: Okay. And what was the
19
     modification to that again?
20
              MR. SULLIVAN: That's the one that includes
     a description of nominal damages in lieu of --
21
22
              THE COURT: Yes. Okay. And we include
23
     both A and B. All right. Thank you.
                                            Then any
     other instructions that we haven't talked about?
24
25
              Okay. As promised -- and I know you've
26
     already done it in part or maybe in whole.
27
     promised I would allow counsel to put anything on
28
     the record about our instruction conference last
```

Thank

1 night, which was lengthy. 2 Now, Mr. Sullivan? And I know you've 3 already addressed some of these things. 4 MR. SULLIVAN: There's -- I think it's 5 conceded at this point. But just on the nominal damages issue, Civil Code 3360 says when a breach of 6 7 duty has caused no appreciable detriment to the 8 party affected, he may yet recover nominal damages. 9 THE COURT: All right. Mr. King? 10 Or anything else, Mr. Sullivan? This is 11 the time if you wanted to put --12 MR. SULLIVAN: Understood. I believe the 13 issues have been --14 THE COURT: I think -- well, I just want to 15 give, as promised, the opportunity. And there will 16 be a record with regard to all these instructions 17 refused, given, modified, withdrawn. 18 Mr. King? 19 MR. KING: The -- I did have one question 20 about closing argument, and that is can we publish 21 the jury instructions the Court's approved to the 22 jury during closing argument? 23 THE COURT: Yes. That's why we do this and 24 spend this time. Anything else? No. 25 Mr. McCloskey?

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I appreciate

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Nothing, Your Honor.

26

27

you.

1 counsel's efforts in doing this.

All right. Special verdict. It has been modified in conjunction with the heading. I haven't had a chance to review it. It was just handed to me. I want to make sure that counsel are all in agreement.

I know, Mr. McCloskey, you were going to modify --

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- the cross-complaint part.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: We did. We took out the business necessity portion of the special verdict form. We now need to take out the clear-and-convincing portion of the punitive damages, and we will do that.

MR. SULLIVAN: And I believe Your Honor might have received alternate copies this morning based on the unjust enrichment issue of the first series of --

THE COURT: Okay. I thought I just had one.

MR. SULLIVAN: You might.

THE COURT: I only received one. A lot of paper up here.

MR. SULLIVAN: So it might be highlighted in the copy you received. We'll correct that where it's not highlighted.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. King, is it in order? 1 2 MR. KING: On the special verdict form, 3 we -- I saw there was added a question about waiver 4 on the breach of fiduciary duty, which is -- makes 5 sense because there's an instruction about it. there was also added a question about waiver on the 6 7 fraud claim, and I don't think waiver applies there. 8 That was Question 12 on page 5. 9 THE COURT: Okay. If somebody has another 10 copy, I am buried in paper here and I must have 11 misplaced --12 Robin, did I give it to you? 13 THE BAILIFF: From Mr. King. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Okay. 14 15 is a different one. I need the -- I'll need the one with the heading, the one that was handed to me this 16 17 morning. Thank you. 18 So defense position, Mr. McCloskey, 19 Mr. Sullivan? 20 MR. MCCLOSKEY: I'm thinking it through, 21 Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Take your time. 23 MR. MCCLOSKEY: I think Mr. King is right. 24 I think waiver ought to come out for the fraud, and 25 we will do that.

THE COURT: Okay. And this has gone -- I can tell you from our discussion last night and this morning, I appreciate counsel's candor and thinking

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27

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and -- because what you're doing is helping me make 1 2 the right decision, and that's the highest form of 3 advocacy in my view. And so -- and Mr. King has 4 done that and Mr. Sullivan has done that and 5 Mr. Aveni. I commend all of you. 6 So can we make that modification? 7 MR. MCCLOSKEY: And we will remap the numbers as well, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: And, Mr. King, otherwise, is the verdict form fine? 10 11 MR. KING: It is. 12 THE COURT: And, Mr. Sullivan, the verdict 13 form is fine? 14 MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Mr. McCloskey, the verdict form is fine? 16 17 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: As we're going to modify. 19 MR. MCCLOSKEY: As modified. 20 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 21 Anything else before -- I would like to give you a 22 chance to take a short break before we commence 23 argument, and we'll see what happens with the lunch 24 hour. We'll take a break after your -- the estimate 25 is an hour. These are not time limits. I'm just 26 trying to get the lay of the land so we can actually 27 get the case to the jury. As I say, I need about

330 on to instruct. And so we'll see where we are.

28

MR. SULLIVAN: I'll be done by then. I don't know about these guys.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: We'll get you there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. KING: There's one thing before --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KING: And we talked about it briefly last night. And I understand the Court had a different view on it than I did, but I want to get it on the record, and that is the order of the argument. You know, we have a cross-complaint. If we were a plaintiff, we would have -- we would go first and we would have a second. And I know that this is a complex case and multiple parties.

My concern is this: Is that -- we have one side and we another side, and Side A goes first and then Side B and then Side A and then Side A. And it's going to be a one-two punch without any chance of rebuttal. I'm not asking for any additional time. I'm just -- anything -- any amount that I have to reserve to rebut arguments on -- rebut arguments that follow my closing argument, that's what I request.

THE COURT: Do you have an estimate of about how long that will be? I know you haven't heard the argument, but you can totally anticipate it.

1 MR. KING: Fifteen minutes.

MR. SULLIVAN: I imagine, Your Honor, if I have any rebuttal, it will be minimal and it will not revoke Mr. McCloskey's issues. So to the extent that's the case, this is just a typical plaintiff/ defendant/cross-complainant/cross-complainant/ defendant situation that doesn't warrant a further tennis match. And to the extent that any further argument would be granted, I ask that it be limited to only issues raised by Mr. McCloskey in his closing.

THE COURT: Mr. McCloskey?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: I agree with Mr. Sullivan.

I think that's proper in terms of the order.

Cross-complainants aren't entitled to rebuttal. So if Mr. King is looking to rebut, I guess he's rebutting as a cross-complainant.

THE COURT: That's what he is requesting.

Correct?

MR. KING: Correct.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: I don't think they're entitled to that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I think you're correct. I guess in thinking about this further from our discussion last night, I was thinking there has been a dispute. There's -- when we started this case, there was four separate lawsuits. And now there's three, one to be tried with the Court.

And we had a discussion and we talked about architecture, and I think that led to one juror being confused as to why Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Aveni are sitting at the counsel table where it says "Plaintiff," which is visible to her.

And -- so I guess I'm wondering. I can tell you what I've done in the past, and it's been by stipulation. I have allowed two rebuttals; in other words, complaint and cross-complaint. And complaint gets rebuttal obviously, and then cross-complaint gets rebuttal. But that was done by stipulation because everybody agreed.

And here we had a little discussion -- and that's probably being diplomatic and understating -- who's plaintiff and who goes first, et cetera, et cetera. So I guess I'm wondering about the fairness and equity of if Mr. King is allowed to rebut, that it be very limited in time and that it be very limited on issues. In other words, he's not going to be able to talk about defending -- that would be inappropriate -- defending the Storix complaint. Can't go there.

MR. KING: That's right.

THE COURT: Implication, throwing things out to allow the jury to infer, nothing about Storix complaint.

But I'm wondering, in light of our discussion, about the equity, the fairness.

Everybody -- this is everyone's one shot at the trial Court level to right the wrong, and I'm wondering about giving everybody their full shot.

MR. SULLIVAN: Sure. So when our -- we initially had that discussion, the landscape was different. We had Mr. Johnson as a plaintiff in the assault-and-battery and false imprisonment lawsuit.

THE COURT: And that's true.

MR. SULLIVAN: And we also had the -Johnson and Sassi as plaintiffs in the derivative
suit, which has been bifurcated to a bench trial.
So to the extent he's a plaintiff and those equities
favored him potentially sitting at Plaintiff's
table, reordering the proof those issues have either
been resolved by the settlement or going be to
addressed at the bench trial, which he'll be the
plaintiff and allowed, I would imagine, opening and
rebuttal on closing.

This case now is solely the case Storix instituted by filing against Mr. Johnson and Janstor in his cross-complaint. There are no equities that favor reordering of proof or changing the normal rules that apply. We've addressed those, and those issues should be handled at bench trial.

THE COURT: And that's all correct. But if it was allowed, it would be strictly, as I said; in other words, it's purely to allow rebuttal to Mr. McCloskey's argument defending the

cross-complaint, and it cannot -- I recognize
there's a lot of overlap, but it's going to be very
narrow.

MR. SULLIVAN: And if I -- if I chose not to do a rebuttal, would that mean the case ends after Mr. McCloskey, or would Mr. King be allowed further rebuttal at that point? In other words --

THE COURT: So you're offering to waive your rebuttal so he doesn't get one?

MR. SULLIVAN: Potentially.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Your Honor, what would happen if the cross-complaint was back against Storix? Why is it that there's any difference in terms of treatment just because they decided to cross-complain against five individuals? It's still a cross-complaint.

And if you're not going to grant rebuttal in that complaint that theoretically, hypothetically, would have a cross-complaint against Storix, there ought to be no difference in how it treated just because they decided to bring its officers and directors.

THE COURT: Well, but they're different parties.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Sure. And I understand that, Your Honor, but it's still a cross-complaint that they had filed. Had they filed it against Storix, they're not going to get a rebuttal. It's

still a cross-complaint. And the only basis, the only standing that they can come in and present that would accommodate the rebuttal is as a cross-complaint. Who they're suing should not make any difference.

THE COURT: Mr. King?

MR. KING: It makes a huge difference. In a two-party case, a cross-complaint has a chance to rebut the arguments made by the other party in their first argument. So they have got -- they hear -- they hear what they make, and they get to rebut those arguments when they make it. I'm going to be making my argument without hearing anything from Mr. McCloskey.

THE COURT: You have a pretty good idea, I suppose, about what he's going to say.

MR. KING: You know, I do, but one of the -- the thing with trials is you can never ever be sure about anything.

THE COURT: On that point, Mr. McCloskey?

In other words, you talked about Storix. Let's say the cross-complaint includes Storix. Now he's saying he never gets to hear in that standard situation. That's why we have that rule.

Cross-complainant doesn't get rebuttal because he's going to be hearing it, in theory, on Storix's opening.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: I --

THE COURT: He's never going to hear from you. So if you have the smoking gun or if you have something that is going to knock the jury's socks off, he just has to sit, when, in effect, on his case, he's plaintiff.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: And I understand that. And if that existed in this case, it may be different. But like you said, he knows what we're going to talk about, Number 1.

Number 2, in a different case in terms of a cross-complaint that brings in additional parties, if this Court would authorize the cross-complainant -- i.e., Defendant -- to rebut the cross-defendants' arguments, then that's what this Court's going to do. And I'm not quarreling with that if that's what the intent is. I'm just saying he's not entitled to it.

THE COURT: And you are correct. I mean -And the way the discussion ended last

night, Mr. King, was I asked -- after denying the

request, I asked if you -- I allowed you to present

me authority, as opposed to weaving from -- asking

me to weave from whole cloth, Judge, do what you

think is fair. And that's what judges do, but

judges like to have authority, as opposed to just

kind of going off and doing our own thing.

MR. KING: So I agree there's no entitlement to it. The question is whether or not

the Court has authority to manage this courtroom, manage the trial, manage the order of evidence and argument. And I think the Court has pretty broad authority, and I think it encompasses the authority to do this, especially in light of the circumstance that the -- even though there are two different parties, there are two different lawyers representing two different groups of parties, they are, in substance, in reality, on one team. And this is a matter of fairness. I think it makes sense that we have some opportunity to rebut Mr. McCloskey.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: If we were on one team, Your Honor, that would augurate against his argument. We are unified. We are a party plaintiff, according to Mr. King. In that case, he's not entitled to rebuttal.

MR. KING: That would be true if they were really unified and they were just doing one -- if they were doing one argument together, and then I had my argument and then they had one rebuttal together, I wouldn't disagree.

But they're -- it's a team, but it's -- you know, it's -- the way that gets treated, because we recognize the corporation is a separate entity, it's separate. So they get two lawyers. They get to argue twice on that.

My point is just that it's clear that --

and if Mr. Sullivan argues and puts up clips of Mr. McCloskey deposing Mr. Johnson about a bunch of things on Janstor, they use that. They coordinate and combine on what they asked at deposition and what they present and -- and vice versa, and they can do that on argument to and it can -- it can prejudice our ability to respond to things.

THE COURT: There's a double-edged sword aspect to your argument, Mr. McCloskey, because if it is true that you and Mr. Sullivan are united -- clearly, you represent different clients -- then, in effect, it's not just two arguments. It's three.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: I agree with you.

THE COURT: Three to one.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: I agree with that. But this is -- this is, in fact, a formulation of Mr. King's thought process. I'm not agreeing. This was Mr. King's thought. Well, wait a minute these guys get to gang up on me, so they get three versus one. That's not the case. I'm just taking his hypothetical. I don't think that's the case at all, and I think he just said it wasn't the case.

any other case you got a plaintiff that sues a defendant. Defendant turns around and sues folks who are not the plaintiff. Does that defendant, as a cross-complainant suing the folks who are not the plaintiff, then get a right to rebut the

cross-defendants argument? Not so, Your Honor.

everybody's sentiment. My concern is, as a practical matter, it's now 10:20. I wanted to start at 10:00. And if I allow it, that's five arguments. We are not going to finish, and I don't want to break argument from doing two or three and then coming back for four and five -- or five, even worse, next week, as in Tuesday. That's really not fair. It's not appropriate.

And I don't want to abuse the jury. We're abusing them now by having them sit out in that hall. But I don't want to abuse the jury further by arguing until 9 o'clock tonight. Five arguments is a lot.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: And I only get one of them, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: And I only get one of them.

MR. KING: I'm happy to limit my time, total amount of time. So if I take it all up on my first one, I don't get it.

THE COURT: Meaning?

MR. KING: If I --

THE COURT: And the amount of time is how much?

MR. KING: I think I said last night no more than an hour and a half, but I know I have to

1 cut that down if we're going to get it done today.

THE COURT: Well, I think probably you all are if -- even if we do four, if I'm going to instruct. Okay.

If you're agreeable -- it wouldn't be fair to impose time limits on you and not on them. And I've said from the get-go I'm not going to time limit the arguments, but I'm very concerned about the practicality. It's not like they're coming back tomorrow morning and can sleep on it. They're going to sleep on it for a long time, many days. And that's just not, in my view, fair at all to anybody.

So I suppose this, Mr. King. If you're willing to -- if I allow it, meaning rebuttal on the cross-complaint only -- in other words, you're rebutting McCloskey, not Sullivan --

MR. KING: Yes.

THE COURT: -- to manage you're time so that opening and -- opening and closing, yes, on a rebuttal is no more than a hour and a half. But I'm not going to say that. I'm not going to impose a time limit. So what I'm doing is I'm asking you, as an officer of the Court, in good faith if you're willing to do that.

MR. KING: I'm willing to do that.

THE COURT: And I'm not going to do that for them, because I've told you this. And what I'm -- what -- I'm not going to put time limits on

you, but I'm asking you to comply with what you said
you would do. And I -- without me even asking, I
would expect that you would do what you were going
to say you were going to do.

MR. KING: That's correct.

THE COURT: So that probably is an unnecessary conversation, but I'm thinking this through. And one aspect -- and I want to get going is -- another factor, and it may not be a huge factor, is that these are consolidated cases. So it's a little bit different than a standard complaint and cross-complainant.

MR. SULLIVAN: Except we don't have any consolidated case.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: It's not a consolidated case anymore. This is just a complaint.

THE COURT: And you are correct. I stand corrected. I was thinking of the cross-complaint as a separate lawsuit. It's not, correct?

MR. SULLIVAN: Correct.

MR. KING: That's correct.

THE COURT: Nevertheless, I'm thinking under all the circumstances here -- and I'm recalling our discussion and motions with regard to this -- I think, in fairness, I'm going to allow it over objection of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. McCloskey. But under the circumstances, I'm going to allow it, meaning a rebuttal on the cross-complaint only.

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Okay. Let's do this. I would ask everyone
1
2
     to be mindful of what I talked about. But again,
3
     there's no time limits on anybody. But if I'm going
 4
     to instruct, I need to really have the case, I
5
     suppose, at -- the very last moment would be 3:45.
     And we'll try to do an abbreviated lunch.
 6
7
              Okay. Let's take five minutes and we'll
8
     come back. Now, the other thing, counsel, is we
 9
     don't have the final verdict form done yet. I know
10
     it's in route. Is everybody okay to go forward with
11
     the argument without it? Is everybody okay to go
12
     forward without it?
13
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: I am, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan?
15
              MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, Your Honor.
16
              THE COURT: Is that fine, Mr. King?
17
              MR. KING: What's that?
18
              THE COURT: Not going -- going forward and
19
     arguing without the final verdict form in place.
20
     other words, it's being modified.
21
              MR. KING: Yes, I'm fine with that.
22
              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. We'll start
23
     in about four minutes.
                             Thanks.
24
              (Brief recess.)
25
              (Whereupon the jurors enter the courtroom.)
26
              THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and
27
                 Thank you very much for your patience.
     gentlemen.
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I know it's long after 10 o'clock. But the good

28

news is we've done everything that we need to do outside of your presence last night and this morning, and so that's completed and now is the time for argument.

You've heard all the evidence. It's now time to hear argument of counsel. You will recall that what counsel say is not evidence. Each counsel will outline for you his interpretation as to what the evidence shows. First, Plaintiff's counsel will give a closing argument, followed by defense counsel's closing argument, followed by Cross-Defendants's closing argument and then two rebuttals, one by plaintiff, one by defendant.

I will give you the concluding instructions on the law which applies to the facts of this case after argument. I will ask the attorneys to try to avoid interrupting each other during argument. If any of the attorneys misstate the evidence or the law, you will rely on the evidence as presented as you recall it and the law as stated by the judge.

Mr. Sullivan, closing argument on behalf Plaintiff, Storix.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

May it please the Court, counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, at the very beginning of this case, I told you this was a case about loyalty. I told you that this was going to be a complex case with lots of evidence, lots of facts. It's taken us

three weeks to get here. And I told you my part would be very simple. I would prove to you that Defendant Anthony Johnson was pursuing his own interests while the director of Storix and owing it a duty of loyalty.

Now, the answer to that is obvious from what we've seen. It's grounded in Mr. Johnson's own words, his own conduct. After being refused control of Storix upon his return, he set out to destroy — he set out to destroy it by whatever means necessary, all the while acting with only his own self-interest in mind. Defendant Anthony Johnson breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Storix as company director.

So what happened? We've heard a lot of evidence, seen a lot of witnesses. What's the story we are to believe? I told you at the very beginning I would show you a lot of evidence of precisely what Mr. Johnson himself said and did in breaching the duties he owed Storix. Did I live up to my promise?

I also said that I knew what Mr. Johnson had said and done in the past and that he would come and testify before you. But I had no idea what he was going to say on the stand in this trial. Now we've all seen it. We've seen what he said in the past, and we heard him testify in this trial.

Did his answers always match up with what he had said and done in the past? Did we learn the

truth? Truth is not a relative concept. It doesn't matter what context you find yourself in. It's based on objective facts, the evidence.

Did Mr. Johnson testify truthfully? Was he credible? Did we see any answers changing based on the circumstances he found himself in, based on his present needs of his case? Was he testifying as Mr. Johnson? Berg? Milton? I'm not sure.

It's your role as the jury to decide what to believe, who to find credible. In making the decision, the Court has instructed you what you can consider. This includes how well a witness remembered the events they're testifying to. How did the witness look on the stand, act, or speak while testifying? Did that witness have any reason to tell something other than the truth? What was that witness' attitude like when testifying?

In assessing credibility, you can believe all, some, or none of a witness' testimony. Now, Storix's claim against Mr. Johnson is for breach of fiduciary duty. As the plaintiff, Storix carries the burden of proving that claim. Breach of duty of loyalty requires proving that a corporate director owing a duty of loyalty knowingly acts against Storix's interest and Storix did not consent, that Storix was harmed, and that Defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing that harm.

It's also a breach of duty of

confidentiality. Did the defendant possess information known to belong to Storix's confidential information and use that to his benefit? Did Storix consent to that? Was Storix harmed? And did those acts constitute substantial factor in causing that harm?

You'll be instructed on what the burden is in proving a claim. In civil cases like this, it's by a preponderance of the evidence. Essentially, that boils down to more likely than not. Now, did the evidence we saw at trial prove to you each of these elements of Storix's cause of action?

We line up the facts on a timeline. We can recall the critical event in this case,

Mr. Johnson's election to the board of directors.

When we go back even further, we can see origins of his plans that he implemented after he became a director. So let's take a quick trip after some of the events we learned about in this trial.

May 2014, Mr. Johnson resigned. He was unable to continue working at Storix. He felt he was not appreciated enough. We saw how his resignation letter was fairly cordial at the time. He was disappointed, but not the level of anger we saw later on.

Immediately, you see responses from his coworkers. Mr. Huffman responds the same day, a few hours later, expresses regret that Mr. Johnson feels

he has to leave. Mr. Turner, likewise, responds to Mr. Johnson's resignation, expressing regret that Mr. Johnson decided to leave. He tells him how important he is to the company. He tells him, We want you here.

But Mr. Johnson is told that he needs to find a way to work well with others, be part of the team. That's not the groveling that Mr. Johnson wanted to hear. He did not feel part of a team because he was used to being the dictator. The guys at Storix did not beg him hard enough to return.

He sends a follow-up e-mail late May.

Again, Mr. Huffman responds. Mr. Altamirano, sales and marketing, worked with Mr. Johnson for years, not one of the type of guys that had issues that led to Mr. Johnson's resignation. He attempts to intervene and deal with Mr. Johnson.

Now, we've heard conflicting evidence on what happened in those discussions. Did Mr. Johnson come hat in hand and say, "I'm sorry. I want to come back, no conditions attached"? Mr. Altamirano had a different story. There were always conditions attached, and it required removal of Mr. Huffman and Mr. Turner.

July 2014, things are not going well for Mr. Johnson. He hasn't found a way to get back control of Storix. Nobody is kneeling to his demands. So what does he do? He approaches the one

person who might have a bigger ax to grind against Mr. Huffman than himself, Ms. Sassi. A friendship is sparked early on.

Within days Mr. Johnson -- or at that time, he writes to Ms. Sassi, "I can start a well-funded and more professionally staffed company. I feel bad for the current shareholders, but they bit the hand that fed them, refused to talk. I'm taking it all back now." The plan starts forming in his head.

Days later, he sends a notice e-mail to Storix. He tells Storix, "Do whatever you want with Storix, but you'll do it without my software. I no longer feel bound to any former promises." He's telling him it's his way or the highway. And as promised, days later, he sues Storix for copyright infringement.

Now, as that case progressed and litigation ensued, Ms. Sassi and Mr. Johnson formed a bond, became besties. He e-mails her about six months later a potential letter to Storix. What does he tell her? In that e-mail exchange, Ms. Sassi first warns him, "Be careful too. They may be your competitors and you might be giving them information to compete against you."

Mr. Johnson, "To tell the truth, I'm about 50-50 as far as whether it's best for me to return or start a new business. In one case, I get back to the business I built. And in the other, I can get

better people I can now afford to hire with

100 percent of the stock. I really don't care."

Now, this is about three weeks before the infamous February 2015 meeting. We saw it drawn on the board. We've heard so much about it. So you get to assume a fiduciary role. So why is this important? Mr. Johnson is revealing to his best friend his intent, his plan. It's there in black and white.

Here's what he had to say about this at his deposition November of 2017, "And you were 50-50, you said, 50 percent, perhaps, waiting for Storix to fail or something along those lines, right?"

"Well, maybe I mischaracterized waiting for Storix to fail. I know why I was under the understanding that Storix was already at this point in financial trouble. They stopped making shareholder distributions and haven't made any since. And they have been in debt ever since, which is what I anticipated would happen. I didn't anticipate, given the state of the company, even at the early stages, that they would even make it to trial before being dissolved."

He expected Storix to be dissolved. He wanted to be free and clear of Storix so he could own 100 percent of the stock of a new company and not be interfered with by anybody else. No former promises would interfere with him moving forward.

With that company, Storix did not fail fast enough, clearing the way for him and his new plan.

When he was unable to regain control of his own product, SB Admin, what did he do? He sought other ways to hurry its demise.

January 23rd, 2015, Mr. Johnson e-mails
Mr. Turner, Mr. Altamirano, and Mr. Kinney, "Final,
final thoughts." What did he say? "The fact is I'm
almost 50 and have no intention of starting all over
now. I can start a new company, something that
actually excites me, but I can't start over with a
new product. That is why I've been working
feverishly on the software for the last eight months
since I left you. For a while, it was intended to
give to Storix at no cost, but that shipped sailed.
One way or the other, it will be on the market
soon."

So what is Storix left to think at this point? They're in the midst of contentious litigation with Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson is telling them one way or another he will have a product on the market that is a derivative of the only product they sell.

Three weeks later, what happens? The infamous February 12th, 2015, board meeting. We've all heard about the shareholder meeting. This is the one with all my fictional colleagues that were there. I'm still waiting to meet them.

Now, how many versions of what happened at that meeting have we heard from the defense table? We heard one from Ms. Sassi, one from Mr. Johnson, and yesterday, in a late breaking surprise, a new one from Mr. Eastman.

In any event, regardless of who's on first or what's on second or whose story we believe, that result -- that election resulted in Mr. Johnson's election to the board of directors and, consequently, a duty of loyalty. He and Ms. Sassi assumed fiduciary duties to Storix, Inc., to look out for the company's best interests. That was their choice in pooling their votes to elect themselves to the board of directors.

As part of the fiduciary duties,

Mr. Johnson owed a duty to remain loyal to Storix

and to maintain the company's confidences. Now,

Storix, it assumed, despite all that had gone on up

to that point, to abide by those new lease and

duties. After all, he chose to become a board

member. They didn't force him on the board. He

used his own shares to put them on that board.

Yet what is the first thing he did after being elected to the board of directors? Texts his good friend Ms. Sassi that afternoon, [as read] "I'm going to finally catch up on my drinking tomorrow -- my drinking. Tomorrow I'm applying for a business license and acquiring a website. Well, if I sober

up enough."

Now, why would he be doing that if he just joined Storix's board of directors? Well, that's precisely what he did. The next day, we saw how he hired LegalZoom to form a new corporation, Janstor Technology. He's finally putting his plan into action, the one he told everybody about before becoming a director.

At the same time, he's forming Janstor. He reserved two website domains, Janstor.com and Janstor.net. You'll recall from his testimony that he privately registered those so nobody would see his name when they searched the ownership information.

Within days of hiring LegalZoom, Janstor is an active corporation with the Secretary of State.

I think you'll recall Mr. Walt, the corporate expert that testified, and he testified Janstor was in operation once the articles of incorporation were filed with the Secretary of State.

Now, what was Janstor? What does that mean? Mr. Johnson told us J, Johnson, a-n, Anthony, s-t-o-r. Now, at trial, he told us perhaps that meant "storage." In his deposition, he told me that meant Storix software. Even in naming his new company, Mr. Johnson was putting himself above Storix.

We saw text messages from Ms. Sassi and

Mr. Johnson in the course of the copyright case looking for the smoking gun. We hear that term in a lot of cases. You might have heard it on TV. Sometimes they talk about the bloody glove. Where's the bloody glove? Where's the smoking gun? Well, sometimes it's as simple as nine words in a text message, "I've been working at getting Storix's new competitor set up."

When he testified in court, he wanted us to believe this was all an inside joke between he and his good friend Ms. Sassi. Do you see any Emojicons there laughing? I don't. You don't get a more clear statement of fact than those nine words. He told his best friend what he was doing.

A couple days later, he e-mails another good friend, Jeff Harding, a softball buddy, the guy he tried to get elected to Storix's board. What did he tell Mr. Harding? While Mr. Harding [sic] is venting about the state of affairs with his dispute with Storix, Mr. Harding advises, "Take the money and start another company. You can start another company. You have more resources now than when you started."

Mr. Johnson responds, "Always a possibility, but a last resort. Would still have to rewrite much of the current code and the entire website and web interface for the product. But so as not to waste any more time, depending on how this

goes, I recently acquired domain names, filed for a new corporation, and rebranded the software under the new name."

Mr. Johnson never says to his dear friend
Mr. Harding he is now a Storix director following
the duty of loyalty. He never says that as a result
of his new position that any plans to form a
potential competitor had to stop. Instead, he's
worried about wasting time.

Now, how is he wasting time? Is serving on Storix's board of directors a waste of time? Was it a waste of time to respect the duties he assumed?

Mr. Johnson now claims that this was a conversation between he and a friend, much like those with

Ms. Sassi, which he never expected to have to defend in court. But isn't that when people tell the truth, when talking to close friends when they think no one else is listening or reading what they're writing?

He already said he continued to work feverishly on the software, even before becoming a director. This e-mail is in February 2015. Did he change the behavior, working feverishly on the software, now that he was a director of Storix?

Well, what did he do next? April 1st,

2015, about six weeks later, he files an application
for a port registration with IANA, all the -- issues
in registrations. This is six weeks after

presumably completing more feverish work on the software.

"Development is complete for a new product to be released around June of this year. This is a derivative of a former product." At his deposition and in court, he denies that was true. He now claims development is not complete. He is being dishonest IANA. The product was not ready for release. He said he was trying to give a sense of urgency to IANA to approve his application. He claims he was lying then but telling us the truth now. I don't know what to believe.

Now, he also tried to tell us in court that the port registrations were no big deal, but he testified at his deposition they're required for that software to work. So what is the truth? What he said when he was motivated to get what he wanted or what he said when he was in court trying to minimize the steps he had taken in violation of his duties of loyalty?

He continued the application process with IANA. We learned about Mr. Berg. What is the big deal with using a fake persona to get what you want? That was Mr. Johnson's question. His sister did it too, so what's the big deal? He was using whatever means necessary to accomplish what he wanted regardless of if it required lying or using fake

people.

Ultimately, his application was approved.

I'm sorry. Here's the Berg e-mail. He references

Storix is using 5026 and 5027, but the app isn't

widely used. We heard from Storix's marketing and

sales people that that product was very marketable,

selling like gang busters. Mr. Johnson [sic]

ultimately approves the two ports June 8, 2015.

You recall Mr. Bergmark, the financial expert. He testified that a website's domains and ports can all constitute assets of a corporation like Janstor. Mr. Walt had testified it would be operating at the time of articles of incorporation.

By now, June 8th, several months after it was formed, Janstor was operating and had assets. You heard no contrary expert testimony on those issues. Johnson himself represented to IANA the software would be released in June. Here we are in June. What happened next? He gets caught. Two days later, Johnson is imposed in the copyright action, and he was confronted with Janstor.

Ms. Sassi, she told us that everyone at Storix knew about Janstor. What did Mr. Johnson say about that? At his deposition in November of 2017, "But you don't believe it was ever public where somebody else --"

Answer, "It was never public and nobody ever knew anything about it. Until Paul Tyrell

asked me what Janstor was, I don't think that the word Janstor had ever been mentioned to anybody ever before outside of, you know, assigning a port number and registering with LegalZoom. I don't even think Robin Sassi knew at that point."

Then Mr. Johnson tried to tell us that Janstor is no big deal, because he'd already tried to dissolve it by his deposition. He apparently lost interest in it.

Two months, later Janstor is still an active corporation. Storix is concerned based on Mr. Johnson's own words that he's continued to feverishly work on the software. You heard testimony from Brian Bonert, seated in the back row today, Mr. Altamirano, seated in the second row, the sales guys at Storix, how detrimental to the company the release of a competing product by Mr. Johnson would be. Mr. Johnson himself testified he would be able to shut Storix down if he started competing within six months. So Storix filed a suit in August of 2015.

Then what happens? A month later, an application to dissolve Janstor is filed with the California Secretary of State. Three days after that, that application is approved. Janstor has been dissolved.

What did Mr. Johnson say about how it would look if he filed the dissolution papers after the

lawsuit was filed against him? Well, let's read it.

[As read] "I'm going to attach the cross-complaint in the Janstor lawsuit and a few more exhibits, but I wanted to read from it and I'll hand it -- and I'll hand you paragraph 48 of it just to make sure I'm reading correctly. Let me read it for the record. Janstor Technology was dissolved sometime in August 2015, having never operated, acquired any assets, or making itself known to the public since Johnson was no longer living in California. Did I read that first sentence of paragraph 48?"

Apologies. I can't read the remainder.

There's a page missing. "I would probably have given up the" -- well, we're missing the key part.

He said he was guilty and foolish, and that's the big surprise. And that's what he did. He filed it after he was sued. Did that make him look guilty and foolish?

He now tells us that Janstor was all about rebranding. It was all for Storix's benefit.

Really? Did he ever once present his plan to Storix to rebrand as Janstor or did he hide in the shadows and do everything he could to conceal his plan until he was ready to launch; that is, until he got caught?

Apparently, angry that he might have to answer for his actions after being sued, how did he respond? He sends what we've actually come to know

as the "Buckle up, boys" e-mail we've seen so many times. He warned Storix, [as read] "Customers and business partners are innocent bystanders too, and I'd bet they'd all be interested in the story here. Take some liberties of explaining a bit more than I need to, and you can certain sue me. Ha-ha. You're going to see this in an announcement board on every message I can get to. Good luck finding another job. Sure, get your lawyers to sue me. It worked so well before."

Mr. Johnson was unhappy he could not control Storix. He was furious his Janstor plans were derailed, so he decided it was time to burn it all down. Was this e-mail in any way going to benefit Storix or its employees? I guess we're not going to get cooperation from this. In short, no.

Clearly, making the threat wasn't enough.

He had to follow through. Johnson sends an announcement e-mail to Storix customers just days later. What does he tell them? "I must demand that you cease further payment to Storix in relation to the software and refrain from downloading any further copies."

What does Storix do? Sells software. How does it stay in business? Selling software. [As read] "The security enhancements to the software have been completed" -- he was referring to his work -- "along with much more. Unfortunately, far

too much damage has been done to me personally and financially to allow these greedy individuals to profit from my work any longer. It pains me to inform you that support for Storix SB Admin will likely -- will very likely end when a ruling is made on the copyright case at the end of the month."

Looking out for his own interests, his work, his finances. Why did he send this? He told us on the stand his attorney guaranteed him a win in three weeks on a motion in the copyright case. What did his attorney tell us? He's never guaranteed a win in his life. He doesn't believe it's ethical for attorneys do so. He thinks he's prohibited from guaranteeing a witness. Again, what do you believe?

Now, did sending this e-mail satisfy his need to keep threatening Storix? Absolutely not.

He was not done with his parade of threats.

Mr. Johnson sends an e-mail to Mr. Kinney about his "Buckle up, boys" e-mail, realizing Mr. Kinney was left out since he left the company.

You remember Mr. Kinney. He's the peacemaker sitting in the front row there on the left. He moved to Minnesota to try to avoid all of this. He apparently didn't move far enough away.

What does Mr. Johnson tell Mr. Kinney? [As read] "Below this e-mail, you'll find the e-mail I sent to you, your co -- your conspirators, and some of the employees at Storix. It is followed by the

e-mail I sent to a large number of customers yesterday. Storix is today in a panic. Their phones are ringing off the hook, and attorneys are gathering. Ultimately, Procopio is notorious for dropping it's clients" -- hold on. Excuse me.

"Unfortunately, Procopio is notorious for dropping its clients as soon as they can pay their bills -- can't pay their bills. This will end Storix's ability to bring in any more income from my work that they just keep using to attack me."

He hoped Storix would lose its attorneys, and he wanted to end Storix's ability to bring in any more income. That was his expressly stated goal. What did he testify to in court? He said he designed that customer announcement e-mail to go to spam folders. He wanted it to just go to one or two contacts to try to prove a point to take him seriously. Is that the store -- is that story in any way believable in light of what he was telling Mr. Kinney at the time?

December of 2015, the copyright verdict, but not the one Mr. Johnson was guaranteed he would get. He lost. He could not deal with losing. So what did he do? He went back to his tried-and-true practice issuing threats.

The next month, he e-mails Mr. Bonert, the employee of sales and marketing at Storix. What does he tell him? He said, [as read] "Brian, it's

important I talk to you, but best you keep quiet about it for now if you want to save your job. I'm contacting you to let you know that you and the other innocent employees are about to lose your jobs. Understand I've still been working on the market -- on the software for two years now. I have a marketable product and you don't. They tell you they own the copyright, but they don't."

He continues, "The judge, after reading the verdict, even looked at them as she referred to the moral issues in the case. There will be a retrial based on the way their unequally unethical attorneys prejudiced the jury in such a blatant and obvious way. I had to fire my own attorney for not listening to me and acting on it as I saw it unfolding. Storix has just been informed they have another long, expensive battle ahead. Trust me they're scared. They deserve to be."

He tells Mr. Bonert further, "There's no reason you can't communicate with me, and no reason you should to -- tell anyone else, especially Manuel. Mr. Kinney ignored a subpoena to testify by faking a move to Minnesota."

Good fake move, Mr. Kinney. Very convincing.

"I take a chance e-mailing you only because Huffman is probably keeping tabs, so delete this and call me if you want to talk. But if you don't --

and I don't mean this as a threat -- I won't bother trying to help the company anymore. I may lose a valuable resource, but I will have my software."

How did Mr. Bonert take this e-mail? What did he interpret this to be? You heard him on the stand. When somebody tells you it's not a threat, it's a threat. You also heard him say the statements in this e-mail were disconnected from reality. How on earth was this e-mail designed to benefit Storix, the company to which Mr. Johnson owed fiduciary duties?

When you step back and look at the history of events, the story becomes very clear.

Mr. Johnson disregarded his duties from Storix from the day he assumed them. He was solely focused on his own interests no matter what the cost and by any means necessary.

So what is the result of all of this? If you recall, we heard from Mr. Brian Bergmark, the expert source called on financial and accounting issues. He explained this chart to us. He explained that we could calculate the value of the benefit that Mr. Johnson obtained from Storix and that he used for his Janstor pursuit naming the value of developing the cost of that software. That value was an estimate of what it would take in labor costs to create the software that Mr. Johnson took and used for Janstor.

Now, how did Mr. Bergmark arrive at this opinion? Funny enough, he largely relied on the work of Mr. Johnson's own expert, Mr. Taylor, who you also met in this case. Mr. Bergmark provided two estimates for development costs. First, in the left-hand column, a market rate salary of a software programmer at \$96,000. That is the salary Mr. Taylor opined was reasonable in the copyright action.

When you take that salary and multiply it by the amount of time Mr. Johnson said he worked on the software at Storix, you arrive at a figure of \$71,994. That's equivalent to the market rate of what a company would have to pay a software developer to work that amount of time.

You would add that to the \$1,163,000. Now, what is that? That is the opinion Mr. Taylor provided in the copyright case for the development costs of SB Admin Version 7.2 copied forward in the Version 8 -- 8.2 at the time. When you add that to the work Mr. Johnson did in further developing the software before he resigned, you get a combined cost to develop the SB Admin software of \$1,234,994.

Now, Mr. Bergmark provided us with a second opinion. The second column is based on a market rate salary for a software developer of \$124,000. Why do we have two figures? The second column is the market rate software programmer salary

Mr. Taylor opined about in this case. So whether you use Mr. Taylor's opinion from the copyright case or his opinion from this case, we have different figures.

You do the same calculation. Work -- amount of work done by Mr. Johnson times the market rate hourly rate, before his resignation, he would get a \$92,996 amount. You would again add that to the estimated value of the labor cost to develop the SB Admin at the time and arrive at \$1,255,996.

Now, I asked Mr. Taylor, Mr. Johnson's expert, if he had any criticism of Mr. Bergmark's work or opinions in this matter and he did not.

Mr. Bergmark's opinions remain unrebutted. Why are these figures important? Because of the value of the unfair head start Mr. Johnson obtained for Storix in violating his fiduciary duties to the company.

Essentially, he found himself on third base acting as if he just hit a triple. Storix got that hit, not him. The only reason he was ready to release the Janstor product in June of 2015 is due to his breach of a fiduciary duty to Storix by taking advantage of Storix's property.

What other harm did Mr. Johnson cause with his disloyal acts? When Mr. Bergmark was here, he explained how he might value the cost associated with employees' lost productivity in dealing with

the fallout from Mr. Johnson's conduct.

He said you could take the annual salary of the employee, arrive at an estimated hourly rate by dividing the estimated hours worked in a year, which he estimated at 2,080, 52 weeks times 40 hours a week, and you multiply that figure by the estimated hours spent in addressing the conduct. That would give you, essentially, the estimated value of the employee time addressing that issue, and you add those together to arrive at a total.

You heard from each of the employees at Storix who had to deal with the customer fallout of Mr. Johnson's conduct. Each of them told us about their salary and about the estimated hours. For Mr. King's benefit, I've done the math for you and calculated the estimated hour -- or the estimated hourly rate by dividing 2,080 and multiplying by the estimated time they said they worked on this.

There are ranges for several of them, estimating that their total value of employee time, and then estimated total time value of between \$2,570.86 and \$3,739.14. Thankfully, given their extensive efforts, their relationships with their customers, their technical know how, those numbers are not much higher.

You heard from Mr. Altamirano that we may never know the true extent of the impact of Mr. Johnson's conduct. Some customers simply don't

renew their service contracts and they don't give a reason why. We may never know who Mr. Johnson actually even contacted. We heard he selected names from a list of over 2,000 somewhere in the range of 50, but don't know. We heard from Mr. Altamirano and Mr. Bonert they each had communications with 20 to 30 customers about this issue. How are we ever going to know the full extent?

Well, here's one way we can measure it.

The harm has -- luckily for Storix, these numbers aren't much larger. The harm that has been done has been significant. You've seen the human toll this dispute has had on the individuals at Storix, the lies, the betrayal, the hostility, the threats, the curse words.

When you retire to the jury room to deliberate, I want you to look at the evidence.

Take some time. Consider how many of those things came from the Storix side. Match that up to how many things did you see come from Mr. Johnson.

In opening statement, I told you that you would be charged with answering a verdict form that boils down to a pretty simple idea: Whose interests was Mr. Johnson pursuing while he was the director of Storix? When you return to deliberate in the room, one of your co-jurors might ask you, "So what's the big deal?"

Why don't you go ahead and read aloud

"Buckle up, boys" e-mail. Go ahead and read aloud the Brian Bonert e-mail. Go ahead and read aloud the customer e-mail. Look through that Berg e-mail, all those documents organizing Janstor Technology, getting it ready to operate, the e-mails and texts between Ms. Sassi and Mr. Johnson, and ask your co-juror if any of this had been done to benefit Storix. The answer's simple. It could not have been.

It's been a long trial. I was remiss in opening in not introducing and thanking

Ms. Alcutara (phonetic), our dutiful paralegal.

Without her in this trial, the presentation of the evidence could not have happened. So we thank her greatly.

Most importantly, I want to thank each and every one of you for your jury service, your commitment, and your attention. The jury process is an institution that's a cornerstone of our society. It's the part -- it's part of what makes this country unique, the system of laws. We no longer settle disputes in the streets. We settle them here by presenting claims and evidence and asking you as citizens and peers of the parties to decide a just resolution. Storix is asking for you to reach a just resolution in this case. Thank you for your time.

THE COURT: May I see counsel over here for

a moment, please.

(Sidebar discussion held without the reporter.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, that was a discussion about trying to accommodate everyone so we're not interrupting argument but we're still taking lunch. And I think, in light of our discussion, what we'll do now -- I know it's early. But take lunch now, abbreviate the lunch hour, and come back at 12:30. It's 11:25 now. That's okay with everybody? I know sometimes we have lunch plans. Are you okay?

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. So remember the admonition. Have a great lunch. See you back at 12:30. Thank you.

(Whereupon the jurors exit the courtroom.)

THE COURT: We're outside the presence of the jury, and I don't like talking about instructions while we're in the middle of argument. But I wanted you to answer some questions for me, and I want to make sure that we're all on the same page.

I've been comparing the different sets of instructions I've gotten at different times with what I have now, and there's some changes and I want to make sure we're all on the same page. So bear with me, please.

1 I want to make sure Special Number 3 was 2 withdrawn. I'm pretty sure it was. The invitation 3 of directors. 4 MR. MCCLOSKEY: It was, Your Honor. 5 you. THE COURT: All right. And then -- I'll do 6 7 this in numerical CACI order from here on. There's 8 not that many. 9 1605, I think the way we left that, 10 Mr. McCloskey, was you might be drafting a modified 11 privilege, which is a modified 215, modified 1605. 12 1605 was intentional misrepresentation. 13 saying that's not here, and I talked about the other 14 things about no one to claim privilege on the stand. 15 So I want to make sure that there's no 16 modification -- I don't have one -- or if you still 17 intend to do one. 18 MR. MCCLOSKEY: We withdraw that. 19 THE COURT: All right. Withdraw 1605? 20 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yeah. It's IID instruction 21 Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay. The 1605? 23 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right. It's withdrawn. 25 The next one is 1901. I do have now 26 Mr. King's modification. I want to make sure that 27 that's all right with everyone. Counsel probably

haven't had a chance to look at it, but in effect,

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1 the blanks are filled in.

What did you do, Mr. King, on this one? It looks like you took the first element and made A and B and then deleted everything else.

MR. KING: Yeah. There were a bunch of alternative ones about partial misrepresentation or they prevented him from discovering, and that's not what's going on here. It's -- I tried to track the special verdict form as much as possible.

THE COURT: And, Mr. McCloskey, if you'd like, so we can take a break -- are you okay?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: I don't know. I haven't

seen it.

THE COURT: Oh, I thought you were looking at it.

MR. KING: I e-mailed it to Marty. Marty sent it back.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: E-mailed it to Marty when?

MR. KING: Just when we were --

THE CLERK: I can print out copies of it.

THE COURT: Robin will print it out.

All right. Let's hold that thought so we can get everyone on their way here.

The next one is 3900. I think what we were going do there is we were going to blend. Instead of me reading it twice, we were going to give one.

The one I have is Johnson only, so I think I need one from Storix. I still have that, but I'm

1 wondering if we blended that to make a generic 2 claim. Did we do that? Can we do that? 3 MR. MCCLOSKEY: I don't know that we can. 4 THE COURT: I think that relates to Storix 5 and Johnson. MR. SULLIVAN: Gotcha. We'll do it at 6 7 lunch. 8 THE COURT: Can you do that? 9 MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Then the 11 next one is 4101. I had that at one time. Now I 12 don't. I want to make sure that we're all on the 13 same page as -- that it's correct that I don't have. 14 4101 is fair to use reasonable care, and that's in 15 the breach of fiduciary duty. 16 MR. KING: That's correct. That was 17 essentially ours and we have withdrawn that. 18 THE COURT: Okay. And everybody else 19 agreed? 20 MR. MCCLOSKEY: I think that's right, 21 Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 23 The last one is 4410. And in looking at 24 that more closely, I now understand the confusion. And the confusion is that I said yes, let's use 25 26 CACI. 27 But, Mr. Sullivan, what you've got in there

is Johnson instead of Storix, and that's why it

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reads in a confusing way. So when you get to the second paragraph, it should read, "To decide the amount of any unjust enrichment, first determine the value of Storix's benefit that would not have been achieved except for its misappropriation." And that is the way I'm reading CACI.

Now, the way you've got it is Johnson in both blanks, and the "his" in CACI may actually refer to Johnson. So I think that's the reason for the confusion. You've got Johnson in the first bracket, and I think it should be Storix. Query whether -- who should be in the second bracket. And if you want to look at the book -- I know it's hard. If you want to visualize this, you may.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ SULLIVAN: I have the electronic copy I can look at at lunch, and I'll see if we can correct that.

THE COURT: Okay. But I think that's -- I think what you were concerned about is that would not have been achieved except for the misappropriation, and that is CACI language. The reason it doesn't make sense is because you got Johnson in there twice. And the question I have is: Should Johnson -- I think it's Storix in the first bracket, and there's a question whether it should be Johnson in the second or Storix.

If I'm -- so but CACI says, on the second bracket, "his, her, or its." If my grammar is

1	right, "his" would refer to the last, and the last
2	would be Storix instead of Johnson. But you're not
3	claiming Storix misappropriated.
4	MR. SULLIVAN: Correct.
5	THE COURT: So that's what is a little
6	confusing. So if you could look at that and modify
7	it, and that's all I had. Have a great lunch.
8	We'll see you back at 12:30. Thank you.
9	(Afternoon recess taken from 11:31 to 12:30.)
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1	SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA;
2	THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2018; 12:30 P.M.
3	* * *
4	THE COURT: Okay. We're outside the
5	presence of the jury. Modifications? There's
6	another one that needs to be modified, 3924,
7	punitive damages, that I didn't tell you about. But
8	I think what I'll do is make it generic myself.
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: 3924.
10	THE COURT: I have two versions. It should
11	be generic.
12	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We took a shot at it,
13	Your Honor. Do you want to see it?
14	THE COURT: Oh? 3924?
15	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Well, we haven't given you
16	the newest since the lunch hour.
17	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
18	MR. MCCLOSKEY: This is the newest set of
19	instructions and the special verdict form.
20	THE COURT: Oh, another set.
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yeah. Well, that's what
22	happens when you get stuff at 11:30.
23	THE COURT: I can find the ones in here
24	that have been modified, right?
25	MR. MCCLOSKEY: The ones I just gave you
26	includes modifications, if that answers your
27	question.
28	THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: For example, 3924, we tried 1 2 to make generic, defendants and cross-complainants. 3 THE COURT: In here? 4 MR. MCCLOSKEY: In what I just gave you. 5 MR. SULLIVAN: And, Your Honor, once we 6 agree on the final form, are we still going to 7 discuss the order? because I think as it stands now, 8 we have, for instance, some of the damages 9 instructions prior to the liability instructions 10 based on CACI numbering. 11 And, for instance, unjust enrichments is in 12 the 4400 series, but it logically makes sense to be 13 with the damages questions. And in order to do 14 that, you have to have the fiduciary duty breach 15 explained first. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask Mr. King. 17 Have you had a chance to look at these? 18 MR. KING: Which ones are we talking about? 19 THE COURT: The modifications I requested, including 4410. 20 MR. KING: I looked at 4410, and I have no 21 22 objection to those. 23 THE COURT: Now, that is contrary -- excuse 24 It's not contrary. So you're both in agreement 25 as to its language? 26 MR. SULLIVAN: I think so. I hope I 27 addressed the confusion. 28 THE COURT: No. I think that there was

1 confusion on my part based on defendant, plaintiff, 2 cross-complainant, cross-defendant. 3 MR. SULLIVAN: On 4410? 4 THE COURT: On 4410. 5 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. THE COURT: Because you've got Johnson in 6 7 there. 8 MR. SULLIVAN: 4410 on unjust enrichment 9 would be just against him. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So where do 11 you want that? 12 MR. SULLIVAN: I think it would make sense with the -- when we read the damages' instructions. 13 But since it refers to a breach of fiduciary duty, I 14 15 think we need to have the fiduciary duty instruction 16 first. My thought was if we do the instructions on 17 the claims and then get into the damages 18 instructions after the claims are read. 19 THE COURT: Okay. So is it agreed then 20 that I do the 4100 series, let's say, after the 21 conspiracy theories? Is that good? 22 MR. KING: I have no objection to that. 23 MR. MCCLOSKEY: No objection on this end, 24 Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Then I'll do that, which 26 would include the 4410. Okay. 27 MR. KING: Okay.

THE COURT: And then are we okay on the

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1 rest of them or have you had a chance to look at 2 them, Mr. King? 3 MR. MCCLOSKEY: We have an issue with 1901, 4 Your Honor, concealment. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 6 MR. MCCLOSKEY: 1(a) says, 7 Director/management defendants with controlling shareholders of Storix. That's the first element to 8 9 establish a claim that Mr. Johnson must prove. That implies that as controlling shareholders of Storix, 10 there's a duty to disclose. That's not the case. 11 12 THE COURT: Mr. King? 13 MR. KING: The -- we have an instruction in there that says there's a fiduciary duty between 14 15 controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 16 I don't think that's in dispute. Fiduciary duties 17 imply or include the duty to disclose material facts. 18 19 THE COURT: So how should it be modified, 20 Mr. McCloskey? 21 MR. MCCLOSKEY: The director/management 22 defendants had a duty to disclose to Storix or a --23 excuse me -- had a duty to disclose, I guess. 24 THE COURT: Well, You're talking about 1(a) 25 or 1(b)? 26 MR. MCCLOSKEY: 1(a). And then with 1(b), 27 the failure to disclose has to be certain material

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facts.

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MR. KING: So the modification for 1(a)
1
2
     would strike the part that says, "were controlling
     shareholders of Storix," and that -- and instead put
3
 4
     "that director/management defendants had a duty to
5
     disclose"?
 6
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: To Mr. Johnson, right.
7
              MR. KING: Got it.
8
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes.
 9
              THE COURT: Is that agreed?
10
              MR. KING: Yes.
11
              THE COURT: Agreed, Mr. Sullivan? I know
12
     it's not your --
13
              MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah.
14
              THE COURT: Okay. Can we modify it that
15
     way then?
16
              MR. KING: Yes.
17
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: And then 1(b) would be
18
     intentionally failed to disclose material of --
19
     certain material facts.
20
              MR. KING: No objection to that one either.
              THE COURT: Certain material?
21
22
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, sir.
23
              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything
24
     else? Otherwise, it's okay?
25
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Otherwise, it's all right
     with our defendants, Your Honor.
26
27
              THE COURT: Okay. Then --
28
              MR. SULLIVAN: 4102 I still need to
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compress that down --
 1
2
              THE REPORTER: I can't hear you.
3
              I'm sorry, Mr. King, can you just step
 4
     aside a little.
5
              MR. SULLIVAN: Compress that down into two
     instead of four categories. That's the duty of
 6
7
     loyalty.
              THE COURT: Okay. And is that one okay?
8
 9
              MR. SULLIVAN: I'm working on that.
10
              THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. And all
11
     the other ones have been modified as I requested,
12
     Mr. McCloskey?
13
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: Okay. Then are we ready?
15
              MR. KING: We are ready.
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: We're ready, Your Honor.
16
17
              (Whereupon the jurors enter the courtroom.)
18
              THE COURT: Welcome back, ladies and
19
     gentlemen.
                 Thank you for your patience.
20
              And, Mr. King, closing argument on behalf
21
     of Mr. Johnson as a defendant and cross-complainant.
22
              MR. KING: Good afternoon. We're here at
23
     the end of the -- almost at the end of the road,
24
     right?
             So you saw on Mr. Sullivan's argument --
25
     Mr. Sullivan's a fine attorney. He did a very good
26
     job piecing a lot of stuff together, putting
27
     together a very good time line.
28
              But the thing that struck me the most were
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two numbers, \$2,570 on the low end, \$3,739 on the high end. That's it. That's why we are here, not because Anthony Johnson was angry, not because Anthony Johnson was betrayed, not because Anthony Johnson lost his temper in an e-mail. We're here because they have got \$3,000 of damages. Three weeks. Now, we've got part of our claim too, but that's their claim against Mr. Johnson, \$3,500 of damages.

You heard zero evidence of one client, of one customer, who stopped paying Storix any money because of anything Mr. Johnson did. They have regular communication with their customers. If there was even the slightest hint that any customer said, "I'm not buying your product any more," because of something Mr. Johnson did, that would be up there. They would be hammering it home every second of this trial. But it's not there because it doesn't exist.

What does exist? \$3,739. That's what -that's what they want all of us to spend all this
time, years of litigation, that's what they want to
be awarded to Mr. Johnson. But you guys are smarter
than that. You know there's got to be something
more, and I think you can probably piece it together
because Mr. Walt testified to it yesterday.

If Anthony Johnson wins, if they can't show any damages, okay, the company has to pay back

Mr. Johnson's defense costs defending against this claim. So they just want you to award \$1, and that way, Anthony Johnson doesn't get to have his costs -- his attorney fees reimbursed. That's what this is all about. That's why you're here. That's why this -- that's why all this work was done on that claim. That's the damage. If there was real damage, you would hear about it. You would know.

Now, Mr. McCloskey talked a lot at the beginning of jury selection about frivolous claims, frivolous lawsuits. And usually, you think that involves, "Oh, I slipped and hurt my back and it's a soft-tissue injury and I can't really prove it, but, you know, give me \$100,000." There's some like those.

But there's another type of frivolous lawsuit, one where there's not really any damage, where it's a strategic reason to take up everyone's time and to go through all this. That's what this claim against Anthony Johnson is about. That is a frivolous lawsuit. Do any of you here honestly believe we would be here if the only damage that existed was \$3,700? The question answers itself.

Now, I have to say you're going to make some -- you're going to have to decide who you believe. You're going to have to decide who's telling the truth. You're going to have to decide what sounds credible to you. One thing that I urge

you not to consider, because it's not relevant, is
the fact that I am here by myself with my clients.

Okay. I -- sometimes I may -- you know, I may be a
little bit flustered maybe because we only have a
few hands helping. Don't hold that against my
clients. Judge this on the facts.

I drew diagram of a conference room, and they have made a lot about the number of Ls that I added. Don't hold the number of Ls that I added to the conference room table against my client. That was, obviously, an exaggeration on my part. Don't hold what I drew against my clients.

I want to talk again more about damage, because other than the \$3,700 in damage, what is their damage? And let's be fair. It's not just 3,700 they're asking for. They actually want -- I think it's somewhere north of 1.3 million. Wow. That's pretty serious. What's their basis for that?

Well, when I asked Mr. Bergmark on the stand, you remember. "What does your number have to do with damages in this case?"

"Well, I'm not sure. I was just called to calculate the value of the software."

Okay. What does the value of software have to do with Mr. -- damages Mr. Johnson caused Storix when he was a director because he breached the fiduciary duty? This was their theory is. Because Mr. Johnson has a copy of the software he wrote, has

always had it for 20 years, okay, they want you to make Mr. Johnson pay Storix for the value of the software copy that he has. That's what they want.

Okay. I can understand why they want money. What's the basis for that claim? This claim is a breach of fiduciary duty. Mr. Johnson is a director. Did Mr. Johnson -- did any of the things Mr. Johnson did that he's alleged to have done as a breach of fiduciary duty involve him taking software? He had the software. He's always had the software. Yes, Storix owns the copyright. We know there was a trial on that. I'm not disputing that. Authors keep copies of their work. That's just the way it is.

Mr. Johnson didn't do anything in breach of his fiduciary duty as a director to take or steal a copy of Storix software. He had it. If -- it might be different if Mr. Johnson, the day after becoming a director, walked into Storix's office, took a copy of the software that he didn't have any right to have, took it home. Okay. Maybe that's different. Maybe that's a breach of fiduciary duty as a director that steals some value of property.

But what he did before he was a director is not relevant. It's not part of this claim. What Mr. Johnson did as a director, what he was alleged to do -- and let's be clear about this. He's alleged to have formed a corporation through

LegalZoom. Okay. That's something you can do as quickly and easily as ordering something on Amazon.

He's alleged to have secured some ports, network ports, and registered a domain name, not even have a website, just registered a domain name.

No evidence that he sold anything. No evidence that he's marketed anything. No evidence that he's ever even done anything to advertise, hire employees, or anything along those lines, and there's a very good reason why and he explained it.

But there's a lot in this case, and so I want to go over again why, why Janstor. What's the whole point of this? Because their theory -- he's competing the day after he becomes a director. He gets his fiduciary duty and the first thing he does, "I'm going to start up a competing company because I've got this duty, and I'm going to breach it the first day." That's their theory. It doesn't make any sense.

So let's take a look at one of the e-mails that is front and center of their case. This is February 26, 2015, e-mail between -- two e-mails between Mr. Johnson and his friend Jeffrey Harding. So I'm on the other one, actually.

THE COURT: Oh, you're on -- ah.

MR. KING: Now, remember, Mr. Harding is telling him -- okay. This is his friend. He's saying, Hey, drop the litigation. Stop trying to --

stop trying to -- give up this dream that you're going to come back to Storix and that you're going to be -- you're going to be able to fix the software, and you're going to be able to right the ship at Storix. Mr. Harding is saying, Stop it. Start a new company and just get away and compete with them.

And Mr. Johnson says, Okay. Maybe, but that's a last resort. And he goes on to say all the reasons why he can't do it. Now, yes, he does say, I did these minimal things. I filed domain names, formed a corporation, rebranded the software. Okay. Again, things you can do probably in the bathroom on your phone nowadays.

But this -- this is one that they haven't shown you, this paragraph. But it is -- it's really the most revealing. Mr. Johnson then says, "The biggest problem I face is that they claim copyrights to the product or at least any derivatives since Storix, Inc., was formed. That includes their claim to all the work I did to add the network security the last year before they ran me out. The updates they said they didn't want and no one asked for that caused this entire stink they now claim ownership of. Even though they don't have the talent to finish it and have already said they don't plan to use it, they just don't want me using it either. If I start a new company, I'm just asking them to come

after me, and I'll have much more to lose. This is why I need the copyright issue settled before I can move."

This is, honestly, everything you need to know about Janstor. He was disputing the copyright. He probably considered if I do win the copyright lawsuit and these guys still won't listen to me, maybe I'm going to need to have another company if I'm -- if I'm determined to be the owner of the software. Maybe if these guys keep spending so much money that the company has to go bankrupt, maybe I'm going to need to have, after this copyright trial, another company so I can continue doing the thing that I've done my whole life. So he says, "That's why I need the copyright issue settled before I can move."

Now, he, obviously, thought it was going to be settled in his favor. It wasn't. As a result, he didn't move. There's not a breach until you move, until you compete. To say every time -- every time you think, you contemplate, you intend to do something that that's a breach of a fiduciary duty you owed to your company as a director, it's not true.

You have to harm them. You have to -- you have to put some -- you -- there has to be some sort of evidence that you really intend do this, that this is more than just I'm -- you know, I'm just

kind of prepping to do this, you know, in the event that I win and I have to -- you know, I can't use Storix anymore.

He wanted to get this settled. He wanted to get it resolved. Now, the copyright case get resolved. If he was going to compete against Storix -- and he testified to this -- he would have done it. He would have resigned as a director. He would have just said, No, whatever. I'm not -- I don't want any part of this corporation anymore. I'm not going to try to -- I don't care about it. I'm going to do my own thing. He stayed as a director this entire time. Why would someone who wants to compete and destroy the company do that? There's no intention to do that.

They make a lot of Johnson's angry e-mails. And what can I say? He was angry. Can't say that I'd use the same words, but I can tell you that I'd probably feel as angry if I were betrayed in the same way he was too.

I -- every case lawyers do, there's always technical elements of each claim and then there's the moral issue of it, the right and the wrong.

That's why we're here. It's not something you can just consult on a book and check boxes on. That's why we have juries. That's why we have trials.

Where's the wrong in this case? Was the wrong done by Mr. Johnson to Storix \$3,700? Was

that the real wrong here? Was the wrong Mr. Johnson being angry in an e-mail? Was that the real wrong here? The real wrong starts, as I said in my opening statement, before there's any litigation.

The real wrong started when Mr. Johnson wasn't going to die anymore.

Hang on one second. June 2011, Anthony,

100 percent owner of the company, gets diagnosed

with melanoma, says he's going to die, expects it's

going to be two years. So he proposes giving

60 percent of Storix to these guys.

His sister comes in in July 2011 to help out and September 21, 2011, Anthony steps away from the company signs over 60 percent of Storix to Huffman, Turner, Altamirano and Kinney. They join the board with Michelle. Anthony, no longer at the company.

You heard Mr. Huffman testify. After

Anthony stepped down, did he have any obligation to

come in? No. Did he have any obligation to do

anything? No. Did he have any obligation to help

out or program? No longer any obligations. But you

also heard that there was an agreement that he would

still stay on the payroll, \$50,000 a year plus

health insurance.

Now, I think that everyone can understand why he wanted to do that. He was looking -- he was fighting -- he was fighting a serious illness. He

needed to get healthcare. So part of what he did is he said, All right. I'm going to invite you guys -- my employees, four longest-serving employees, I'm going to invite you to be my partner, be a partner in my business.

Now, if you've never had -- if you've never gone into business with someone else, whatever form, it's hard to conceptualize it. The best -- I think the thing that everyone probably has the most -- the most ubiquitous experience of partnership is usually marriage. I think that's the most common partnership.

But the point of any partnership -- anytime you go into business with someone, you join up with someone -- is that you trust them. I think Anthony definitely did. He trusted these guys with 60 percent of his company.

And the fact that they didn't put this agreement in writing that he said, "I trust you guys. I'm going to go fight this disease, and I trust that you won't turn around the next day and cancel it," that implies some amount of trust. And they didn't.

In the meantime, however, Mr. Huffman hires Mr. Smiljkovich in 2012 to come in and look at the company books. Smiljkovich was there -- I honestly forget whether it was one day or two days. One or two days. The first day he was there, Michelle

testified that the first thing he asked was not profit or loss statement, was not tell me how much the company is making, it's, "What's going to happen to your brother's shares after he dies?"

Okay. Now, maybe that was

Mr. Smiljkovich's at the time acting on his own, on
his own accord. Maybe he didn't have any
instruction from Mr. Huffman on that. That was -if that was just a one-off incident, I'd probably
agree, but it wasn't.

And we know that -- that the concern -- the consistent emphasis on what's going to happen to Anthony's shares. We have to get Anthony's shares because we have to keep this company owned by the employees. There's no dispute about that.

They had an expert come up and say, Hey, that's a legitimate thing. We -- you guys should -- we definitely want to do that. That's a great thing we should do. The companies do this all the time.

That's their argument. They just want -they don't even deny. They wanted to keep it owned
just by the employees. But here's the thing, when
Anthony invited them to be partners with him in his
business, they accepted that invitation to be
partners. They accepted obligations of trust that
go along with that, especially assuming the majority
ownership and control of the company.

The question that you guys will have to

decide later today is whether or not they breached that trust. Ask yourself -- before all of the angry e-mails, before everything broke down, before Johnson filed a copyright lawsuit, before he sent an e-mail saying, I've got all these conditions I'm returning, ask yourself who breached that trust?

Who started this?

It sounds -- it sounds childish, because if you've ever had kids, you know, "He started it. She started it," da, da, da. And unfortunately, there's an element of that in this case where it started, and then it continued to escalate, both sides. My mom used to always tell me it takes two to fight. It doesn't matter. Both sides continued to escalate.

So look first to see who breached that trust first. Let's look. Let's look at what the evidence shows. Anthony returns in 2012, meets the fellow shareholders for a meal at the Cheesecake Factory, talk about coming back and doing some work. So he says okay. He returns January to March 2013. He's doing two tiny projects, small projects, SEO updates and updates to Version 8.1. Okay. Helping out. Sounds like everyone's doing good so far. Sounds like everything's okay.

From Anthony's perspective, what he knows at the time, hey, he's back. He's working with his team. His employees got the ball. Everything is

great. He's with his friends again. He's with the people that he thought were more than just employees. They were now partners. They were now friends with him. Everything is going fine as far as Anthony is aware.

But what Anthony doesn't know, January 4th, 2013, David Smiljkovich e-mails the DenHerder law firm. He asks for -- he -- he wants to enter into a legally binding agreement between Storix, Inc., and Anthony Johnson's estate to automatically buy back his shares at a set price upon his death. That would be wholly normal, a perfectly legitimate request, if he had talked to him about it with Anthony first.

Now, maybe this was one instance. Maybe

Mr. Smiljkovich didn't have time, forgot, didn't see

him around the office that day. If that was it, we

probably wouldn't be here, right? But you know

that's not it. Mr. Johnson's still working there.

Later that month, he learns his melanoma is gone.

He's no longer going to die. He tells people and he

puts an announcement on Facebook.

Now, February 4th, somewhere between

Mr. Smiljkovich's e-mail to the DenHerder firm on

February 4th, Ms. Sassi got wind of what

Mr. Smiljkovich was trying to do. She is in the

middle of marital settlement negotiations. She

immediately gets concerned that her friend, David

Smiljkovich, her lifetime friend, is working with

Huffman to try and do something that would prevent

her from getting a fair shake in that settlement

negotiation, a fair split in the property, whatever

it was.

So Mr. Smiljkovich, he says, Hey, Robin,
I'm feeling horrible about the situation. I'm doing
my best to stay in control. Truly sorry. As a sign
of good faith on my part, I'm forwarding my e-mail
conversation to you. I'm disclosing this to you as
I sign of my good faith. Doesn't even owe her a
duty, other than they're friends. There's some
trust in between them.

But he recognizes I got -- I want to tell you this. I want to disclose it to you. He knows that this is -- this is an important thing. This is an important thing that he should disclose, but not to Anthony. He -- he's going to disclose it to Robin, not even a shareholder yet. He's going to show -- he's going to show his good faith to Robin. He's going to obey the instructions and requests of his employer, the four shareholders, Mr. Huffman directly, because he's got a job there. He wants -- he wants to stay in good favor of Mr. Huffman.

And okay. If I were an employee, I'd probably want to do the same thing too. But ultimately, someone's responsible for not telling Mr. Johnson. Someone -- they're -- Mr. Smiljkovich

isn't the only one that knows what's going on here.

So he goes on to say, "I normally would have contacted you about the situation, but I knew this was partially an estate issue." This was really -- he's saying this was -- I would have contacted you about this, but this is an issue between us and Anthony estate.

That's kind of accurate at this point, right? because he still thinks Mr. Johnson is going to pass away soon. But again, where's the good faith towards Mr. Johnson. And this is just the first e-mail, right? And if this was it, again, a couple e-mails, a month later, okay, doesn't disclose to Mr. Johnson right away, probably -- I'd be able to chalk that one up as a mistake. Maybe they're busy, didn't get around to it. Maybe they just -- you know, just did one e-mail, no one got back to them, and they said, Ah, we're dropping it. If that were the case, I might agree with them. Probably don't even need to bring it up to Mr. Johnson.

But was that the case? No, it wasn't.

This -- this is what Mr. Smiljkovich writes to now his insurance broker, Mr. Cogdill, three days later, February 7th. Now something's changed. All right. First DenHerder request, what was that for? That was, Oh, we want to buy Anthony's shares after he dies, because he's going to die and we want to buy

his shares, buy him out.

But what's changed now? Now he says, "I'm not talking just in the event of death. But if one of the shareholders were to suddenly decide to leave the company or get divorced, we want to make sure we have the financial ability to buy back those shares to maintain control of the company."

I mean, they're not hiding it in any of these e-mails. They're explicit about what they want to do. They want control of the company. They want to keep control of the company. They want 100 percent control of the company.

Now, if -- if your -- if I imagine myself in some hypothetical business situation, partner, and my partner is doing this, the first thing I'd say to myself is, Why haven't you told me this?

Why? This seems kind of relevant to me. You're talking about getting my share of the company that I founded, that I gave to you, that I trusted you with. Why aren't you talking to me about this?

And what's the reason? What's the excuse?
What's the excuse they give? He didn't need to
know. We didn't have an obligation to tell him. No
statute that says you have to tell Mr. Johnson that
you are thinking about buying his shares and
enacting this agreement that would require him to
sell you shares if he terminates his employment
after he signs the agreement.

There's no statute that says that. Okay.

That's why we have fiduciary obligations. That's why we have -- that's why we enforce trust relationships. When you put your trust in someone and they breach that trust and they betray your trust, that's why we have the litigation system. In fact, their own expert even told you that yesterday. What's Mr. Johnson's remedy? File a breach of fiduciary lawsuit.

Now, Mr. Johnson is -- I mean, he's -- you know, he's a fiercely motivated individual. Okay.

That's -- and what happened to him was -- it's not happened to me, so I can't say I've ever been in his shoes. But it's a betrayal. If you've been betrayed, you know how angry you are.

You've seen the darkest corners of

Mr. Johnson's thoughts, his e-mails. His response

to his betrayal. And there's a lot of -- a lot of

their case is: Judge him based on his response to

being betrayed; judge him based on what he writes in

these e-mails; punish him for what he says.

That's -- that's a large part of their case. Show

these e-mails. He swears. All these words, he's

mad.

People get mad. They get angry. And when they do, it's, you know, I'm not going to try to sugarcoat it. It's not something that -- you know, it's not something that is pleasant. If you want to

talk about it and make -- make a big part of, you know -- it's not something you want -- that you want to focus on. But in litigation, we do that.

But bear in mind everything Mr. Johnson threatened to do, everything Mr. Johnson actually did was what? Expressed how mad he was, threatened to do things he had a legal right to do, to sue. It's not illegal to say, "If you don't do what I want and make this right, I'm going to file a lawsuit." That's actually your right to do that.

Now, it's not -- it's not legal to threaten to hurt someone, threaten to do something that you don't have a right to do. But that's where

Mr. Johnson was. And I've never been in that situation, but it -- you know, without having been in his shoes, I can't say that I wouldn't have acted the same way or in a similar way or had these similar feelings.

So we're now in February 7th. Mr. Cogdill responds. Mr. Smiljkovich writes back on February 11th, "Okay. That sounds like we're on the right track. I'll check with the banker as well and let you know what they say. I'll begin working diligently on valuation for the company. We can't go anywhere until we know how much money we are talking about to start with." February 11th.

So you heard his testimony. The next day, he calls California Bank & Trust, talks about

getting a loan to purchase Anthony's shares. Now, the following day, the banker who he talked to at California Bank & Trust, Lea Zanjani, she writes back. She says, "My SBA specialist put together an Excel worksheet based on a \$1 million loan."

He says okay. He laid out a game plan in his -- in his e-mail to Mr. Cogdill. He said, [as read] "I'll chat with a banker and let you know what they say. They will probably want me to apply for a line of credit, which we would -- which we would draw upon to buy back stock in the short term. I'll start doing that, start working on a valuation. The good part, though, is that I got the president and the vice president discussing the issue, and they absolutely see the need."

The funny thing is, as he goes on, he says,

[as read] "These are del -- very delicate

discussions that the shareholders need to have with

each other, and I'm doing my best to nudge and guide

them in the right direction."

Is he? Mr. Johnson doesn't even know about this, and it's expressly for the purpose of purchasing his shares, for buying his share of the company. If my partner does this in business, at this point, I'm starting to feel betrayed. If this is all he's doing and he's not telling me, I feel betrayed.

Now, fast-forward to August 2013.

Mr. Johnson comes back to work full-time on Version 9.1. You guys have heard a lot about the software Version 9.1. I'm not going to bore you with that. There were -- you guys have heard all the testimony about how they had a different way of doing things and everyone was going to do it all on their own and finish it individually. And then when it was ready to go, they'd put it together.

And that was their version of a team atmosphere. Instead of people working on the same thing together, it was everyone works on their own on a different thing, and then -- okay. That's" what he starts doing August 2013.

But again, Mr. Smiljkovich to Ms. Sassi, the same month that he starts says, "Anthony's stock is 40 percent of the company's value, so we get \$1.36 million. Theoretically, that's how much the stock is worth."

She testified that the -- conversations with her about buying Mr. Johnson's shares. Again, Mr. Johnson, no idea. But he's committing himself to a long-term project with his partners that he trusted for -- it turned out it be seven months. It was probably actually going to be about a year. But he's committing himself to it, and they don't tell him this. You partner with someone. You commit yourself to a long-term project. If they don't tell you that, do you feel betrayed? I would.

1 What happens next? He returns.

2 | Smiljkovich talks to Sassi about the plan. Everyone

3 develops their software, move to a new office.

4 2014, Mr. Smiljkovich in conversations now again,

5 this time with Wells Fargo, a new banker. And now

6 he's talking about a line of credit and all that

7 stuff. Did things change? Did he no longer want to

8 buy Anthony's shares? Well, let's take a look.

March 27, Celine Ghebbano, Wells Fargo
Banker, says, "Also, I have reviewed Storix's
financials in view of the purchase of Anthony
shares." Talks about a loan and how to finance
that. A few weeks later, "Let me know if you have
any questions regarding the SBA proposal for the
purchase of Anthony's shares."

I mean, this is explicit, right? This is not purchase of shares in the event that, you know, you need to buy someone out because of some shareholder -- it's explicit. You guys know this. Of course, no update to Mr. Johnson, no information to Mr. Johnson, nothing at this point. He's now worked for the company this whole time this is going on. No one's told him. This is up to the people he trusted with his company. This is what's going on behind his back.

Now, they say -- Mr. Smiljkovich said, Oh, I never brought it up to Ms. Ghebbano. She was selling it to me. She brought it up. I had

nothing -- no. It's only a coincidence that the same SBA loan that Ms. Zanjani proposed is also the same one that Ms. Ghebbano is talking about here.

You read and -- you heard in Ms. Ghebbano's deposition testimony that I read to you yesterday, she was clear, Mr. Smiljkovich brought this up to her. Share acquisition loan for Mr. Johnson's shares.

What else is going on in March 2014?

Mr. Smiljkovich writes his own performance review.

Now, to be fair, Mr. Smiljkovich claims that this was not dated. This was misdated. That this was actually May, 30th, 2014. That's not what what's on there, but he did say he didn't write this to transmit to anyone. It's for his own edification.

It's his own thoughts, his own summary of how he did his first year.

I may actually credit him on that. Maybe he was wrong. Maybe he wasn't, but maybe he was wrong on that date. But most importantly, let's look at what he writes. "In the near future, I will begin working on amending the company bylaws to promote the shareholder vision of maintaining an employee-owned and managed company."

Again, they're not hiding this. They want the company. They want to own it. He wants to make the banking and credit card relationships more independent from Anthony Johnson. Again, there's

other ways to do this. One of them is just to ask

Anthony, "Hey, do you want -- can you add us to this
account? Can you help us? Can we work with you?"

That's not how they chose to go about it. Is that
how business partners operate?

Well, Mr. Johnson is now, unbeknownst to him, trusting -- the gentlemen that he trust -- that he trusted his company with, has now worked for seven months updating this software. He testified -- you heard him -- he would not have worked there for no increase in what he was being paid. He had the \$50,000 that he didn't have to do anything for. That was the testimony. That was -- you're leaving. Here you go.

Now, maybe there was some expectation that that wasn't to be forever, because the expectation was that Mr. Johnson was going to pass away. I can see -- that's probably correct. That's probably -- that sounds right. But that highlights a very important thing, that the expectations of the parties aren't always written down in a perfect contract that spells everything out, especially when you trust someone and you go into business with them.

When you trust someone to be your partner,
you don't always spell out every different way that
they can betray your trust and breach -- breach
the -- the obligation to act with good faith between

each other. You can't. It would be ludicrous to expect that. But it highlights the fact that they acknowledge that, that they had expectations it was only going to be until he died.

So what happens in May 2014? This is where -- you heard it. I'm not going to rehash it. You know, there was a fight. Mr. Johnson, working on his own with no help. And then when he tries to merge with the work they did, there's problems.

Now, some say it was Mr. Johnson's fault. Some say it was their fault.

Well, the undisputed testimony on their side is that Mr. Johnson's the most-skilled and experienced programmer. I'm going to assume that if there was anyone at fault on that, it would be the person that they admit is the most-skilled -- it wouldn't be the person they admit is the most-skilled and experienced programmer. But whatever. I don't want to get into a debate about whose software is better. That's not why we're here.

The point is that Mr. Johnson did all this work, worked hard, tried hard to work within these rules, this team environment where everyone works alone as a team. And then they say, Well, no one really wanted the thing you were working on anyway. Who wants it? Why? Who cares? No one wants the thing you were working on.

So he -- I mean, how would you feel? You devote seven months of your life to something, and it's not just -- it's not just a job. It's the thing you created. The thing you've worked 20 years of your life for. It's your creation and you've devoted seven months of your life to improving it and helping these guys you trusted with your company that you thought were your partners, help them make it better. And they say, All that work, sorry. No one wants it. I don't think we're even going to use it.

You'd feel betrayed. Mr. Johnson felt betrayed. And he put his -- he put his comments down in e-mails, resigning. You saw that. The funny thing is you saw these e-mails from Mr. Huffman and Mr. Turner back and Mr. Kinney saying, Hey, we want you here. We want you to come back. We want you to come back.

And Mr. Johnson writes an e-mail saying,

Oh, you know, I -- all these things of -- all these

complaints about how things are going, and here's my

feelings.

And Mr. Huffman's response -- this is the first -- first, I think -- if you were going to look for where does it start, I mean, it's hard to say.

Some of it, maybe it started already. But I think at this point, they're kind of doing a little dance. You know, I left. You know, I want you back. I

mean, there's kind of an expectation that everyone wants him back. He wants to return.

But then what happens? There's a fight.

Anthony resigns, e-mails. Turner responds. Kinney responds. Anthony's last day. Anthony sends his final thoughts. Huffman writes back. This is Exhibit 197. You guys, remember, this is in response to Anthony, "Thank you for reaching out to explain your feelings on the matter. I wish we could have come to a closer agreement. David Smiljkovich will be mailing out a separation agreement," polite, dry, business way of saying, "Good-bye. You're done. That's it. Our relationship is now over."

Maybe Mr. Huffman -- fine. Maybe that's the way it was. Maybe that's the way it should have been, but why? Was that what everyone expected? Was that what Mr. Johnson expected? I don't think so. I don't think he expected that it would just end. I think everyone was still in the process of saying, All right. Find a way back.

Well, someone does response to Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Altamirano responds. And Mr. Altamirano -
there's e-mails on this in evidence and you'll see.

Mr. Altamirano replies back, kind of continues the

"You're awesome. You're great. We've got to work

on things." He listens to him. They start talking

on the phone back-and-forth, "I want to come back.

Can you talk to these guys? Can you sit down -- can we have a sit-down conversation? Can we work things out?"

And then -- I believe it was -- let's see.

I think it was July 15th. Exhibit 338 is Anthony's
e-mail the following day, and he says there, This
is -- I was -- I can't get over the fact that you
told me they didn't want to compromise, they weren't
willing to talk about it, that I didn't have -- I
wasn't coming back.

Now, when I asked Mr. Altamirano about this on the stand, I asked him, "You had those conversations? This day, you told Mr. Johnson that he was not welcome back?" Mr. Altamirano didn't [sic] say "Oh, I didn't use the words 'He wasn't welcome back.' I said, 'You're not a good fit. You're not -- you know, you should move on.'" Whatever the words were, Mr. Altamirano's testimony was crystal clear that yes, Mr. Johnson was done. He wasn't coming back.

That was it. He gave control of the company to his employees. He trusted them. He comes back to work. There's some disagreements. He resigns, just like he resigned before. And now, instead of like in 2012 when he was not working, resigned, came back, they said, "Oh, yeah, come back. We want your help." Now, he can't come back. Why? What's changed? He resigns in 2011; he can

come back. Resigns in 2014; you can't come back.

Now, they say -- this is the ploy that you can't get distracted by. They say that

Mr. Johnson -- oh, the reason why he -- we didn't want him back or couldn't have him back is because he was demanding conditions. He demanded that

Mr. Huffman step down. He demanded that we go off the board. He wanted to control the company again. He did make those demands after they told him he wasn't welcome back.

Read Exhibit 338. That's the first time he mentions a copyright lawsuit, and it's in response to that e-mail that morning on July 16th that

Mr. Johnson says -- that Mr. Altamirano calls him.

And then in that phone conversation, "Set forth your written conditions for coming back." Mr. Johnson's already, you know, threatened the copyright lawsuit.

Now he sets forth his written conditions. Yes, he sent those, but that was after they said, "You're done. You're out. You're not coming back."

That conversation where they said -- they communicated through Mr. Altamirano to Mr. Johnson, "You're not coming back," that is where the betrayal happened. When you go back to deliberate, look very closely. Everything you read from Mr. Johnson before July 15th, everything you read from Mr. Johnson after July 15th, it is two separate people. One is very angry. One is the type of

person who was just betrayed by the people he trusted the most. The other one is a person who just survived a harrowing medical condition and is confused about why his employees who now run the company, they can't get along with him.

One is Mr. Johnson still thinking and acting in good faith, trying to get along. And the other Mr. Johnson is the one who's been betrayed by the people he trusted most. That betrayal is a breach of trust here. That is the breach of fiduciary duty here.

We talked a lot about things that happened after that. And I mean, honestly, I think we probably spent too much time on things that happened after that, the shareholder agreement, shareholder meeting. I did that to illustrate -- I wanted you guys to see that to illustrate that the -- the escalation that happened after that was both sides. Mr. Johnson escalated. They escalated. They kept on fighting. They were fighting. But no one -- that's -- I mean, it's not war. That's on a totally different level. But this was -- in a way somewhat, they were at war. Who started it? July 15th, Mr. Johnson, you're done. It's ours.

So what are the damages? Mr. Taylor had showed this loss summary, and he provided some numbers based on Mr. Johnson living to some age or whatever he's going to be and getting \$50,000 a

year. And why -- how is that relevant to damages, and what's your job as a jury?

You don't have to believe that Mr. Johnson would be -- live until some certain age. You don't have to accept that as true. You don't have to accept Mr. Taylor's numbers. The point is that Mr. Johnson had an expectation that if he would somehow survive, he was going to be still involved with the company in some position working on the software.

And honestly, I think the cross-defendants, they had the exact same expectation too, because by their own admission, what did they say when

Mr. Johnson comes back? They say, Hey -- basically sat him down and offered him -- "Do you want a controlling role in the company? Do you want to say decision-making role?" Johnson says, "Not yet. I'm not ready yet. I want to come back and do some coding."

They had an expectation that maybe the guy who was the most experienced, the guy who founded the company, the guy who wrote the software would naturally be the person to come back and take control of some of this stuff if he were to return healthy. And so they offered him that position because that's what they expected.

Why did they offer it to him in 2013 and why not in 2014? What changed? They didn't want

him. They were done with him. Who knows? They didn't like him. They were fine taking his -- accepting the stock that he offered them, accepting the share of the company, accepting all the profits that they made for, you know -- since -- after 2011. They loved that. They didn't like the fact that the guy that was their partner -- they didn't like him.

so Mr. Johnson had -- he expected -- he trusted them that he would have some role in the company. Now, what kind of roll in the company?

Now, you know, probably it would be more than \$50,000 a year if he was going to come back. He was making three times that before. But I don't -- I want to have the most reasonable number we could come up with, which was the number that he was getting when he left -- they agreed -- \$50,000 a year. That number, I think at a minimum, was the most reasonable expectation he would have. It's at least what he would reasonably expect, because, A, that's what they agreed; and B, it's far less than he would have otherwise made.

So if you think the defendants/cross-defendants breached the trust that Mr. Johnson put in them before the litigation war broke out between them, if you think that's what happened, you decide for how long, for how much Mr. Johnson -- that's going to cost Mr. Johnson.

This is what it's cost Mr. Johnson so far,

which I think is reasonable for the last three years or since Mr. Johnson was -- you know, since Mr. Johnson was pushed out of the company, but you guys decide that. You guys decide how much he lost in the past. You guys decide how much he'll lose in the future. You don't have to accept Mr. Taylor's numbers. You don't have to accept anyone's numbers or anyone's representations. You decide. This is -- this is your job.

This, again, the loss of salary differential, that's what Mr. Johnson -- that's the difference between what Mr. Johnson gave during the seven months that he worked there in excess of what they paid him, because he wouldn't have done it if they had told him -- if they hadn't concealed what they were doing behind his back. And honestly, if I was in his shoes, I probably wouldn't have done it either.

So he gave -- and I don't think they dispute this. He gave \$124,000 worth of services. He was paid 50-. The prorated difference for that seven months is \$56,000.

Thank you for putting up with us this whole time. Thank you for putting up with me, and let's go. We'll move on and hear some more arguments, and we'll get the show on the road. Thank you.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, let's take our afternoon recess. We'll be in recess

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1
     15 minutes. Remember the admonition. Thank you.
 2
               (Whereupon the jurors exit the courtroom.)
 3
              THE COURT: We're outside the presence of
 4
     the jury. I need one more instruction, 430,
 5
     substantial factor. If somebody can get that for
 6
     me.
 7
              MR. SULLIVAN: We have a 4102 being revised
 8
     on its way back.
 9
              THE COURT: Has it been revised yet?
10
              MR. SULLIVAN: I sent a revision.
11
     Mr. Ready (phonetic) is --
12
              THE COURT: Okay. Those are the only two
13
     things, so I need those two. And thank you. We're
     in recess.
14
15
              (Brief recess.)
16
              THE COURT: Okay. I've got 430, 1901 as
17
     modified, and 14 -- I mean 4102 that have been
18
     handed to me. And are we all in agreement?
19
              MR. SULLIVAN: I believe so.
20
              MR. KING: Yes.
21
              MR. AVENI: Do you want another copy,
22
     Your Honor?
23
              THE COURT: No, that's fine. These are
     fine.
24
25
              So everyone's in agreement?
26
              Mr. McCloskey?
27
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honor.
28
              THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan?
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1
              MR. SULLIVAN: Yes.
 2
              THE COURT: Mr. King?
 3
              MR. KING: Yes.
 4
              MR. SULLIVAN: They were going to modify
 5
     1901.
 6
              MR. AVENI: We're going to add material
 7
     facts in 1901.
              THE COURT: I'm seeing it on 1(b) already.
 8
 9
              MR. AVENI: It is in 1(b).
10
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: He was talking about adding
11
     it to 1(a), Your Honor.
12
              MR. AVENI: Mr. King was talking about
13
     adding it to 1(a), you have a duty to disclose
     material facts. And B --
14
15
              THE COURT: I thought he said that you
16
     wanted that.
17
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: Well, we did not say that,
18
     Your Honor, but I'm fine with it.
19
              MR. KING: If you want to keep it that way,
20
     that's fine too. I just wanted to bring it to
21
     everyone's attention.
22
              THE COURT: Okay. I'll do whatever
23
     everyone wants.
24
              MR. MCCLOSKEY: We'll add material facts.
25
     Can we just interlineate it in here?
26
              THE COURT: That's fine.
27
              And that's agreeable, Mr. King?
28
              MR. KING: Yes, it is.
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THE COURT: Thank you. Let's bring the jury. Thanks for doing this so quickly.

(Whereupon the jurors enter the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Welcome back, everyone.

Mr. McCloskey, closing argument on behalf of cross-defendants.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

Ladies and gentlemen, as to the first order of business, I want to thank you for your patience. We've been at this three weeks. We've all been here together. We've all gotten 3 weeks older together. I want to thank you for being here, and I want to thank you for your attention.

You know, the beauty of our justice system is that it brings folks like you together, 12, now 15, people who are sitting in judgment on folks. You bring with you an extraordinary mix of background, an extra mix of experiences. We have an airline pilot. We have an architect. Go down the row. We got a mechanical engineer, and we got a guy who keeps the Marine Corps out of environmental trouble, and everything in between. It's extraordinary. And what that does is it brings a collectively wisdom that you bring into bear in judgment on this case. So to -- bring that collective wisdom with you as we review what's happened in this case.

If you recall, during my opening statement,

I mentioned this case is as simple as ABC. I want to go back and revisit that. Let's talk about the A. The A is arrogance. I talked about that in my opening statement.

And let me confess something to you. Maybe someone who started a company, maybe he's entitled to be a little bit arrogant. He stood it up. Maybe we ought to give credit to Mr. Johnson for standing up Storix. Maybe there is a little bit of arrogance there that ought to be yielded to. Maybe possibly even excusing — that arrogance even excusing him being a benevolent dictator, maybe just a little bit here. There was Mr. Johnson and then there was everybody else. Before he left in 2011, he called the shots. Everyone else was there to support him. Maybe there's legitimacy to that.

Mr. Johnson then gets the news no one wants to get with a terminal illness, and he says then that he gave away 60 percent of his enterprise, 60 percent of Storix. But the evidence shows, ladies and gentlemen, he didn't give away anything.

He did transfer 60 percent of the interest, but that was in exchange for a two-year commitment. The same thousand shares he had when he started is the same thousand shares he has as he sits here today. He didn't give away any of his shares. If he had, unless he did -- the likes of Mr. Huffman here, but he's going back to school. And that's

what the evidence shows. And absent an exchange of some consideration, Mr. Hoffman -- Huffman was on his way.

Now, Mr. Johnson claims that Mr. Huffman and the other four director/management defendants are a bunch what spineless, greedy, and ungrateful people. This even though Mr. Huffman put his educational future on hold to service the likes of Storix.

Now, at the same time, Mr. Johnson, the evidence shows, unilaterally reduced his compensation to \$50,000. That's what happened. So I'm short one way. He's looking at two years. And remember Mr. King, he said that the defendants agreed to keep Mr. Johnson on the payroll, but that's not what happened at all. This is back in the days of benevolent dictatorship. No one agrees with the benevolent dictator.

What happened was Mr. Johnson, by way of executive fiat, said, I'm going to take \$50,000.

I'm going to go off on the waning days of my life, and I'm going to do what I'm going to do. Given

Mr. Johnson's leadership style at the time, these director/management defendants had no say-so in the decision. So is that a matter of agreement? It was a matter of doing what Mr. Johnson decided.

But the key is that Mr. Johnson was kept on Storix's payroll. Mr. King said that. He was kept

on his payroll. Mr. Johnson got a W-2. Mr. Johnson paid federal tax. He paid state income tax. Why?

Because he's an employee. He's still hired. He's still working for Storix to present some value.

Now, the reason that they did that is because Mr. Johnson needed at the time to remain qualified for health insurance. Pre-existing condition was to kill him otherwise. So he needed to be an employee. He needed to be drawing a salary. He needed then to be qualified for health insurance, and that's precisely what happened.

Now Mr. Johnson comes into this Court and he claims that he's entitled to \$50,000 for life, and he's entitled to \$795 a month for health insurance premiums until he reaches age 65. Ladies and gentlemen, where's the agreement here?

Remember, that's an executive fiat. That's not an agreement, oral, implied, written, otherwise. This is a dictating term that Mr. Johnson imposed. It's not an agreement. There's certainly no agreement to pay him \$50,000 for the rest of his life.

Apparently, you know, Mr. Johnson doesn't remember saying that.

He testified to the contrary in his copyright trial. This is his testimony here. He knew -- he knew that by resigning his employment, he was giving up his \$50,000 salary, which makes sense because no longer is he an employee, no longer does

he get a W-2, no longer does he pay state and -he's no longer an employee. So as a result, he no
longer gets the \$50,000 salary, and he admitted it
under oath at the copyright trial.

Now he comes in here and says, Wait a minute. They said they were going to give me \$50,000 for life. And as a result, I'm entitled to 1.4 million bucks. That's what he's come in here claiming. It's just not the case and that's not truth.

You know, what the principal advantage of the truth is? You don't have to remember it. He didn't remember the truth. He didn't remember what he said in the copyright trial under oath. That's because what he says in here, \$50,000 a year for life, is not the truth. He couldn't remember what he said. That's the truth, ladies and gentlemen.

I mentioned this in opening statement. I'm going to reiterate it. You sit as fact finders in judgment on Mr. Johnson and every other witness' credibility. You decide to believe him or her, or you decide not to believe him or her.

Remember him in his deposition. During my opening statement, I played his deposition clip.

And he told me that if he's grilled, I would never get the real truth. This is a person testifying under oath now. He demonstrated that in spades in this trial. I cross-examined him for a day. You

saw it. I grilled him. Did you get the real truth?

If we didn't listen to his depo, we'd never get it.

He also demonstrated a marked facility to deceit. Let me go over a couple of those things.

Remember IANA, the port registration thing? He was applying to get two port registrations. What did he do? Created a fictional character, Berg, and he did that to try to get around whatever he had to get around to get port registrations.

Now, justified? Who knows. But the fact is that he's willing to engage in a scheme to defraud. It's a deceptive practice to get what he wants. He's come in here testifying on this -- at this trial doing the same thing. Is he trying to get what he wants? Can you believe him?

He also testified that he dissolved Janstor before the trial, before this lawsuit. But then he's confronted with the dissolution papers that shows that no, no, no, you didn't dissolve it until after this lawsuit was filed. And as a result, one could at least reasonably imply that the reason you dissolved it is because you got caught. That's the lawsuit. That's why he dissolved it. He admitted as much in his testimony. He'd be crazy to dissolve it afterwards. Well, he did.

Now he says, Well, wait a minute. There's some other thing out there, some other dissolution paper filed with the Secretary of State in

- 1 California. Where is it? It doesn't exist.
- 2 Instead of dealing straight with the likes of
- 3 Storix -- Storix, instead of dealing straight with
- 4 them, what does he do? He conscripts Ms. Sassi over
- 5 here. He conscripts her as a mole, my term, not
- 6 hers. He conscripts her to engage in fact
- 7 gathering, intelligence gathering, whatever it is
- 8 | that you want to call -- and she did so and, in the
- 9 process of doing so, betrayed -- betrayed a
- 10 | lifelong, since-childhood relationship with a very
- 11 close friend. That's what we're talking about.
- 12 These are the people that we're dealing with.
- 13 Later what does Mr. Johnson do? He tries
- 14 to screw up Mr. Bonert as well. Mr. Bonert was here
- 15 | testifying. Remember what he said. Sent that to
- 16 Mr. Bonert. Now, delete this e-mail and call me
- 17 | back. He didn't want anybody to discover that he
- 18 | had sent him this e-mail.
- 19 And remember the many times that
- 20 Mr. Johnson testified regarding exaggeration. I
- 21 think Mr. King called it "he got mad." Does that
- 22 | justify lying under oath? He got mad. We're going
- 23 | to talk about getting mad in a minute.
- Next thing we're talking about is the many
- 25 \parallel times that he confessed exaggeration. Is this an
- 26 exaggeration? An e-mail sent on October 7th to who?
- 27 Mr. Kinney. Saying that today Storix is in a panic.
- 28 \blacksquare This is right after that delightful e-mail this

Mr. Johnson wants to send to Storix's customers. He sends this to Mr. Kinney in Minnesota. He starts, In a panic, phones ringing off the hook. Attorneys are gathering. This is the day after he sent it. Exaggeration? Was he mad when he sent it?

You also heard from Mr. Johnson's sister. Do you remember Ms. Orr or Ms. St. Claire or whatever her name was? Seems like they're cut from the same cloth. Demonstrated the same comfort with deception. Instead -- if you remember, instead of dealing with Storix creditors honestly up-front over the phone, what does she do? She created this fictional character, not Berg. She created a fictional character called Holly, told the assistant to the European trademark attorney for Storix that Holly was the new Storix rep to manage payables. Also maintained that Holly was hearing impaired and worked only electronically, so send all your bills to her. And Mr. Johnson got on the stand afterward -- do you remember his comment about that? He thought that was kind of clever.

Now, her testimony revealed that when Mr. Johnson brought her in at \$120,000 a year that she didn't have much qualification, if any, really, to kind of take over the enterprise. But regardless Mr. Johnson's sister -- he can appoint who he wants at the time. Does so, pays her \$120,000 for the year or annually.

And what happens then? She then butts heads with Mr. Huffman, trying to develop the love-hate relationship. On the one hand, after Ms. Holly or St. Claire or Orr leaves, she wants Mr. Huffman to pad her LinkedIn resume, if you recall that, to avoid the appearance the job hopping. But on the other hand, she testifies in a deposition in a copyright case that she hoped Mr. Huffman died in a fiery inferno. So love-hate? Who knows.

But after Mr. Johnson left in 2011, the benevolent dictator goes out the door and the environment then migrates into one that's team oriented. No longer were the director/management defendants supporting cast for Mr. Johnson. And the culture shift, how did that work out for everybody? It's positive.

In the midst of a recession, what do you have here? Mr. Johnson leaving and sales going up. So it went from something just minus -- just below 2 million bucks, sales go up to almost 2 1/2 million bucks, not bad for the key coder/programmer to be gone. That team-oriented culture worked. That was the final analysis.

But when he returned, Mr. Johnson just thought like it was as if he never left, things are going to go back to the way they were. Now, Mr. King, in his closing, he called that a betrayal.

There's no betrayal. The fact of the matter -- the reality of the case is that Mr. Johnson just couldn't stomach the new reality that Storix now worked as a team.

Mr. Johnson, he wasn't working full-time when he came back, right? He showed up when he wanted to. But the fact was he was no longer in charge, and that got nasty. No longer were the other folks there to clean up after him. So what did he do? He quit. Now, he's off payroll, no W-2, no federal tax, no income tax. Why did he quit? Because he didn't need the \$50,000 anymore and he didn't need health insurance.

So Mr. King he asks, Well, wait a minute.

What's the wrong in this case? Here's the wrong.

The wrong is when Mr. Johnson quit, he then

commenced a relentless campaign, personal attacks,

and almost ceaseless litigation. Mr. Johnson claims

that the director/management defendants forced him

to resign? Do you recall that testimony? He

forced -- these folks forced him to sign his name or

send an e-mail that says, Hey, I quit.

Well, wait a minute. You got Mr. Huffman and you got Mr. Turner four hours later, maybe six hours later, sending Mr. Johnson an e-mail saying, Hey, wait. You can't do that. We love you. Come back -- that kind of thing -- but you got to work as a team. That's the issue.

So undeterred, Mr. Johnson faults these folks for not begging him to come back, but all he had to do was join the team. That's all he had to do. That's why he demanded -- then demanded for Mr. Altamirano -- a few days after he resigned he demanded that Mr. Huffman and Mr. Turner immediately step down from the board and David to resign as president.

Mr. Johnson gets up on the stand and says,
Oh, wait a minute. There was phone calls. There
was this, that, and the other thing before this
e-mail. If I were to come back, I would have been a
star employee, or whatever he said. But there's no
evidence to that.

Mr. Johnson is a prolific e-mail writer.

If we learned anything in this case, he loves to communicate by e-mail. Where are those e-mails?

Mr. Altamirano, he gets on the stand and says,

That's not the way I recall it. Yeah, I remember phone calls with Mr. Johnson, but it was kind of like it was when he left in 2011. He just rants and raves and rants and raves. That's why

Mr. Altamirano asked Mr. Johnson, Hey, look. Stop this. Just put it in writing. So he did and that's the writing. But I'm going to come back, no conditions? We haven't seen that e-mail.

And it's curious that he would say that.

Come back, no conditions, because this is from a guy

who a week after he was elected to the board, he goes to his softball buddy and he tells him he doesn't care about the company. He wants to come back as an employee to a company he doesn't care about? That doesn't make sense. That, ladies and gentlemen, is arrogance.

Now I'm going to go to B, bullying. I mentioned it during my opening statement, and I think the evidence has shown that in this case,

Mr. Johnson wasn't the victim. Mr. Johnson was the bully. Why was he the bully? Why do I say that?

Weaponizing litigation. That's what he did. He was on a crusade. He was weaponizing litigation by suing the pants off everybody, trying to get them to come out of pocket to pay for their own attorney's fees. That's what he's trying to do. For whatever reason, for the good or the bad, this is what he did. But don't come in here and complain, C, that you're bullied, B, because you're so arrogant, A.

No. That doesn't fly. That's the collective wisdom you have to bring to this whole process.

Mr. King said that with Mr. Johnson there's no way -- there's nothing wrong with threatening lawsuits here. There's nothing wrong with that.

Maybe to some degree that would be the case, but that's like saying you have a first amendment right to free speech. You got a first amendment right to say what you want to say. But,

ladies and gentlemen, you have no first amendment right to go into a crowded theater and yell "fire." So what's the difference? Is he mad, threatening litigation? Did he go into a theater and yell "fire"? Let's go through that.

Early manifestation of his litigation
weaponizing. This is correspondence with Manuel
Altamirano. It's the last page. "Unless Dave and
Rich make serious concessions, Storix can expect a
very difficult and expensive legal battle." Next
sentence, "Will begin this legal action in the next
few days." Now, is that mad or is he yelling "fire"
in a crowded theater?

Next, aware the impact, he says, [as read]
"I'm aware of the impact of the suit severely
impacting Storix's shareholders, its employees, it's
ability to conduct daily business, or any M&A
activity should they wish to fight this battle,
know -- know that it will likely end with Storix
having no cash, no product to sell, and/or owing
royalties for future and even past sales." Is that
mad or is that yelling "fire" in a crowded theater?
[As read] "Should Storix wish to fight, know it will
have no cake -- no cash."

But not three months after resigning,

Mr. Johnson sues Storix. He filed a lawsuit.

That's how this all started. We're in one of those sequence of lawsuits, the first one of which he

filed. Mr. King says, Well, wait a minute. Going back and forth, you know, who broke up with who? Is that really at issue? Well, perhaps not.

But who started this mess? It's

Mr. Johnson that filed the copyright lawsuit back in

August 2014, and why did he do that? He rested -
wanted to rest control of Storix. Why? Because he

wanted to compete with them. Whether or not that

competing was legitimate is a different issue. But

what he really wanted was pick up his bat, pick up

his ball, and go home. I'm not part of the team.

I'm out of here. And I'm going to get my software

back that I worked on for so long. And you

ungrateful bastards, you're not giving it to me, so

I'm going to go sue you. And that's what he did.

He sued hem. Arrogance undeterred, Mr. Johnson,

what does he do? He blames the director/management

defendants for forcing him to file that lawsuit.

Go to another exhibit here. The e-mail that Mr. Johnson sends to Mr. -- a week after both were elected -- to Ms. Sassi, a week after both were elected to the board. Mr. Huffman here, David, [as read] "Still proud of how well he screwed me over, but he has no clue of the storm that's coming his way, he says. Is that mad or is that yelling "fire"?

Second fall out, [as read] "They have now strengthened the minority shareholder oppression

suit, what will" -- all caps, apparently an expression of intent -- "be added against them if litigation continues. No job -- that means no job, no dividends for a year, and they'll be fighting personal legal battles the company will not pay for." There is the motivation. I'm going to make the director/management defendants come out of pocket. Is that mad or is that yelling "fire" in a crowded theater?

Mr. Johnson's singular focus right now is about now getting these director/management defendants to come out of pocket and pay legal expenses. He wants to make them hurt. He wants to make them bleed. You can file a lawsuit if you want. Maybe you can even yell at people if you care, if you're mad, but you can't yell "fire" in a crowded theater. It's just the way it is.

Okay. So he sends in the "Buckle up, boys" e-mail. We've all seen it. That's his one option that he's giving. He also says in there, [as read] "Give your stock back, resign the board seat, terminate employment, and only then will the director/management defendants not be sued." That, ladies and gentlemen, is weaponizing litigation.

Then he sent the letter to the customers that was unforgivable. You've seen it. It's the e-mail he sent saying, Stop paying Storix. We've all seen it. Now, was he mad then when he told the

customers, Hey, stop paying? Was he mad then when he told the customers of the organization which he is now a member of the board that you shouldn't pay them any more money for the sole product that they make?

He also said in an e-mail to Mr. Kinney, he says -- he brags about it really. He says to Mr. Kinney, "It is followed" -- that's the "Buckle up, boys" e-mail -- "followed by the e-mail I sent to" -- what -- "a large number of customers."

And you remember him on the stand here saying, I just sent it to a few, a few customers.

No harm no foul. I don't know why the day afterwards he's telling Mr. Kinney he sent it to a large number of customers. Look at that. "Storix is in a panic. The phones are ringing off the hook. Attorneys are gathering." You saw that in spades here. That, ladies and gentlemen, is weaponizing litigation. That's bullying.

Now, Mr. Kinney, he's the one that was on the stand just a couple of days ago. He's the guy from Minnesota. All right. He's got no appetite for this. He's trying to get away from all this. Mr. Johnson apparently knows he went back home, because Mr. Johnson sends him a text threatening to sue his parents.

Mr. Kinney, he's the guy that Mr. Johnson told Mr. Bonert that Mr. Kinney ignored a subpoena

to testify by faking a move to Minnesota. That's what he is telling Mr. Bonert, who's sitting right in the back there.

Not to be out done, Ms. Sassi enlists the assistance of a friend to drop off a package of financial documents or other documents at the doorstep of Mr. Kinney's parents in Minnesota.

That's weaponizing litigation. This lawsuit, further evidence of weaponizing litigation.

The only damage Mr. Johnson claims in this case -- the only evidence you've seen of any damage whatsoever is \$50,000 per year for life and \$795 per month for insurance premiums until age 65. But this, again, is what he said in the copyright trial. When he quit, he gave up the \$50,000. That's because he didn't need the medical insurance. Now he's asking to give \$795 a month until he hits 65. This is what he said in previous testimony.

Now, even if he didn't give it up, even if he said, "Oh, that never happened, and I'm entitled to it," and so forth -- if you recall my cross-examination of Mr. Johnson, I said, "Why are you suing these guys? These guys don't write your checks. They're not obligated to give you \$50,000 a year for life and \$795 a month for health insurance premiums. That's your compensation when you're on a payroll. Who owes you that compensation?

Mr. Huffman? Mr. Turner? Mr. Smiljkovich?

Mr. Kinney? Mr. Altamirano in the back? No. This is a Storix obligation. He's suing the wrong people. That's weaponizing litigation.

Mr. Harding -- Mr. Johnson is not seeking salary and benefits from Storix. He could care less about that. Mr. Johnson is doubling down, like he told his softball buddy. He's going to file another lawsuit. This one in state court. That's why you're here. That's weaponizing litigation. Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Johnson is not a victim here. He's the bully. There's no evidence to the contrary.

Let me move on. C, final letter, constant, constant, constant complaining. That's all you've heard during the closing argument in this case. It's more complaining. You heard an earful from Mr. King regarding the complaints Mr. Johnson had. He doesn't like the way he's being treated.

I get it. You don't like the way you're being treated. You don't like the fact that when you come into a team-oriented environment that your benevolent dictator ways don't wash anymore. I understand that, but that's a complaint that not compensable. Fine. You don't like being treated [sic]. So what?

So what is it? Hurt feelings? Is that what Mr. Johnson is complaining about? His feelings are hurt? Where's the damage from that? He's

claiming \$50,000 a year salary for the rest of his life. That's not for hurt feelings.

Now, in my opening statement I told you that you're also going to listen to a laundry list of corporate governance complaints and, in fact, you did. Let me go through at least some of them, because you also heard from Mr. Walt yesterday. He was the corporate governance expert. He testified and we kind of picked them off one by one.

Curious. Where's the expert corporate governance person that came in on behalf of Johnson and said everything that Mr. Walt said is wrong? There is no expert because it isn't wrong. His expert testimony is unrebutted.

He testified regarding corporate democracy, the business judgment rule, the duties of loyalties and care. He went through the entire laundry list of corporate governance complaints. And he said, in general, but I'm going to pick off a few. He said that everything that these director/management defendants did was consistent with their duty of loyalty and care. Where is evidence to the contrary? There's no rebuttal expert. And rightfully so, because there's nothing to rebut. Truth is unrebuttable.

So Mr. Walt walked you through the original bylaws. You remember the original bylaws and the amended bylaws. We talked a little bit about that.

The right of first refusal, we talked a little bit about that. They're customary. It doesn't make any difference, because it won't affect Mr. Johnson's shares anyway because that was -- that bylaw amendment was enacted after Mr. Johnson had his shares. So it doesn't affect pre-existing shares. So what's the bylaw amendment problem here? It's just another complaint. I get it. You don't like it. So what?

And when I say, "So what," I don't mean to be tough. I don't. What I do mean to be is -- challenge you to ask yourself, Where's the damage? Why would he be entitled to any compensation because he really just doesn't like what is happening or perhaps the way he's being treated?

Buy-sell agreement. God, we spent a lot of time on the buy-sell agreement. Do you remember this is -- this is -- what was that? There's this fictional buy-sell agreement that we've -- just never have seen a copy of.

Mr. Johnson comes in and says, Well, wait a minute. This buy-sell agreement that ultimately made its way into the share agreement is not the buy-sell agreement he's talking about. The problem is we haven't seen another buy-sell agreement because there isn't another buy-sell agreement.

The buy-sell agreement Mr. Walt testified about, it's a customary succession tool. Makes

sense. Mr. Smiljkovich testified, Hey, this is what we're trying to do. We're trying to accommodate potential outcomes. It's not just the debt or the enforcement demise of the 40 percent shareholder. It could be divorce. It could be you're selling your shares to someone else. It could be a whole host of issues, but all of that is within the ambit of success planning.

Remember the key on a shareholder is that only those who signed it are bound by it.

Mr. Johnson didn't sign it, so where's the problem?

It's just another complaint. Now, he didn't sign it and he said in my examination of him because -- well, Number 1 he wouldn't have signed it anyway, but he was never given the opportunity to deal with it, to review it, to negotiate its provisions. You concealed it from me. You concealed the fact that you are -- you're getting loans. You're concealing the fact you're getting credit cards, lines of credit. You're concealing all this from me and you should have told me. Because you didn't tell me, you engaged in a fraudulent concealment.

Mr. Smiljkovich testified at length, almost ad nauseam, about why it is that the revelation -- the disclosure of a buy-sell agreement was delayed until Mr. Smiljkovich sent there -- this Exhibit 86. It was delayed because he's dealing with lawyers, trying to tee things up, and all of those things.

But who did he send it to? July 16, 2014, that's 3 1/2 years ago. He sent it to Mr. Johnson. So he's not given an opportunity to participate? Is this fraudulent concealment?

Then we went through the litany of board meetings and the minutes, if you recall. The first one was February 12th. That's where the board -- board of directors was voted. That's the one where this ballot issue was created.

We also looked at the board minutes about two months later in April where the proposed shareholder agreement was presented. That's the one Mr. Eastman was at. He's the one that represented Mr. Johnson. He's the one that wanted three additional weeks to review, comment, get back, that kind of a thing. And what did the board do? They granted it.

A month later, have another board meeting. You saw those minutes. Mr. Eastman, he didn't bother participating. He didn't come back and say, "Hey, there's a problem here." There's no notes. There's no evidence of review. There's no evidence of negotiation. Mr. Johnson never said, "Yeah, I got back to them. I said there's this problem and that problem. Let's negotiate a solution." But if he wasn't involved in the process, there's some fraudulent concealment here?

Mr. Johnson then claims, Well, wait a

minute. You can't vote that buy-sell agreement in as a member of the board because it's an agreement with Storix, the company. You're the board of the company, and you have a -- you're an interested director, and thus, you're disqualified.

Mr. Johnson says, Well, that's why I didn't become a member -- a party to the shareholder agreement. I'm not going to join an agreement that's illegitimate.

What did Mr. Walt say? The three members of the board that voted on that and improved that buy-sell agreement did so legitimately. Why?

Because they're not financial interested. There's no disinterested issue here. There's no issue of disqualification of an interested board member.

That is not what disqualified the board member, thus three votes against Mr. Johnson. It was enough to carry the day. So there's no problem here.

So even though Mr. Johnson was invited to participate in the negotiation and conclusion of a buy-sell agreement ten months previously, even though his attorney had it for review for -- for weeks before, and even though Mr. Johnson said he would never be party to that agreement in any event, he comes into this courtroom and complains to you that somehow that breaches his -- our fiduciary duty to him. I don't get it. That's just complaining.

I'm going to go through a laundry list of

other things very quickly. Mr. Walt -- because it seems --

Awfully, warm in here, Your Honor. I don't know if I'm speaking on behalf of any members. It seems awfully.

The stock option plan, do you remember that part? There's no concealment here either.

Considering such a plan is good corporate governance. Do you remember Mr. Smiljkovich talking about stock option plans? Why did he do that?

Well, three Rs, right? Reward, recruitment, retention.

What's happening? They're losing people.

They're losing coders to -- I don't know -- Google or whatever they're going. The Googles of the world are paying them a heck of a lot of money. How are you going to keep them here? Mr. Walt said, Give them some stock. And that's what the stock option plan was all about, but the fact was it was never enacted. So what's the complaint? Nothing ever happened

So why are we hearing this in our ear,

Mr. Johnson? That's just -- it's just another

complaint. That, ladies and gentlemen, is arrogance

and it's arrogance undeterred.

Mr. Walt also discussed the new ballot.

That's getting back to that February board meeting.

Remember we had an issue with Mr. Altamirano going

out and getting a new ballot because he wanted to replace the ballot that he had. They wanted to make a big deal that there's some big conspiracy out there.

Remember Mr. Eastman yesterday? He came in and he can't even get the facts right. He said there's some counsel that left with Mr. -Mr. Kinney -- no, that left the room, and it wasn't him at all. It was Mr. Smiljkovich. He can't even identify Mr. Smiljkovich. So that's what happened.

There's no issue here with a spoiled ballot. Mr. Walt talked about that and said, Hey, no problem with respect to replacing ballots. It's kind of like going to a polling place, right? You can get a ballot replaced. Corporate governance, the same way. You can get a ballot replaced.

And besides, these gentlemen were trying to get it right, because they knew there was a storm coming from Mr. Johnson given the way and manner things are progressing. So they had to get it right. So what did they do? They scripted it with the assistance of their attorneys so they'd get it right. Follow the script, everything's good, and it all works. And that's what happened. There's no issue here. This ballot a ruse. That's just another complaint.

Code of conduct. Remember when he talk about code of conduct? Wait a minute. You're

squelching me. I only get three minutes to talk.

Well, I think the evidence shows why it is the board want to limit it to three minutes, and that was a code of conduct then that was applied cross the board. Everyone in this room that's a director of Storix was subject to that three minutes and abided by it with two exceptions, and they're both seated at that counsel table.

They tried to govern the amount of time of discussion, rightfully so, according to Mr. Walt.

It didn't work. Given the personalities of those two that are sitting at that table, can you wonder why? That's why you have a code of conduct there.

But perhaps most important, Mr. Johnson comes in here and says, Wait a minute. I am treated differently. There's dispirit conduct here because Storix is advancing the defense costs of these gentlemen and they're not advancing my defense costs, says Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Walt explained why that was so. The law, corporate code, corporations of -- the bylaws, I should say, the corporations code, authorizes an advancement of attorney's fees, defense costs, as it says, so long as there is that undertaking.

Remember we talked about an undertaking? Hey, look, here's what you go to do. You got to make a claim.

Go to the company and say, "Hey, I want my defense fees advanced, and here's my promise to pay it back

if, for some reason, it's decided that I wasn't entitled to it." That's the undertaking.

These gentlemen submitted an undertaking and have their defense costs advanced. This gentleman, he had no claim, provided no undertaking, doesn't have his defense costs advanced. But let's presume for the moment that he made a claim, made an undertaking. Would it be legitimate for the company to advance these defense costs but not his?

Mr. Walt testified to that specifically, and he says absolutely.

These director/management defendants are getting sued by Mr. Johnson because of how they discharged Storix's business. Mr. Johnson, what's he getting sued for? He's being sued because he was discharging the business of a competitor. That's the difference.

So even if there was an undertaking, even if there was a claim, it would be well define -- legitimate for Storix to deny Mr. Johnson's request for the advancement of defense fees while granting the defense fees to the director/management defendants.

Arrogance, that's a charitable way to describe Mr. Johnson's expectation that Storix is going to advance expenses to the very director it is suing for starting to compare -- starting a competing business. You're going to sue a director,

1 and then somehow you're going to advance him defense 2 costs to defendant against your suit? That's 3 arrogance. He's coming in here and he's telling, 4 I'm getting cheated, dispirit treatment, because 5 Storix is advancing the defense costs of these gentlemen because I sued them for breach of 6 7 fiduciary duty. That's unfair. Just not the case. 8 Mr. King said these folks want the company. 9 Mr. King said they wanted 100 percent of the 10 company. Mr. King said they want to keep the 11 company. Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Johnson, he's 12 still a 40 percent shareholder. He's not employed 13 because he quit. He needs to stop complaining. He's not the victim. He's the bully. He weaponized 14 15 litigation and it has cost Storix dearly. Ladies 16 and gentlemen, enough is enough. It's as simple as ABC. 17 Thank you very much. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan, closing rebuttal 19 argument on behalf of the plaintiff? 20 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 You heard Mr. King. That's it. That's why 22 we're all here, 3500 bucks. Is that really it? 23 did Mr. Johnson just write a check for \$3,500 if that's all it was about? 24 25 Six months, that's how quickly he was 26 certain he could put Storix out of the business. 27 Should Storix have waited that six months in order

to bring a claim against Mr. Johnson?

28

Frivolous lawsuit. Did I ask for \$1 in opening statement? What is frivolous about a company trying to save itself from ruin?

Credibility is crucial to every case. You heard Mr. King admit for the first time that his drawing was obviously an exaggeration; don't hold it against his client. Did we hear it was obviously an exaggeration at the time it was drawn? Did

Ms. Sassi take the time to correct him and tell him,

"No, there weren't nine mystery lawyers in that room"?

Credibility is everything. "Don't worry," we're told. "Authors always keep copies of their works. That's just what they do." Did anybody hear any expert testimony saying that's what authors always do, any testimony whatsoever? Did you hear any authority for that statement?

Regardless of how he obtained it,

Mr. Johnson was a director of Storix, and knew he
possessed the company's source code. He knew that
it was confidentially maintained, and he used it to
his own advantage.

Can we see the trial exhibit -- go to the next page, please.

Mr. King drew our attention to the Jeffrey
Harding e-mail between Mr. Johnson and Jeffrey
Harding, pointing out some lines in the first
paragraph. One sentence he didn't highlight: The

last sentence, "or I need them go out of business first." That's been his goal. He needed Storix out of the way.

He says in the next paragraph -- he ends with, "The only way I can be safe to move forward is if Storix cannot harm me anymore. But time is not on my side, so I'm pulling out all the stops."

We've seen some of those stops. Who knows if we've seen them all? There may be some we'll never know about.

So Mr. King claims that there's no big deal. Janstor made no sales. No harm, no foul, right? As we heard Mr. Johnson testify, he does not regret his actions, just the consequences of those acts.

Well, the judge will instruct you at the end of this case. What those consequences are for Mr. Johnson's acts. One of those instructions is referred to as "unjust enrichment." That instruction will tell you that you may award an amount measured by the unfair head start Mr. Johnson obtained by using the company's property. That's the Mr. Bergmark software valuation we discussed. Yes, it's a significant amount, and it's what the law allows.

So is Storix just suing for \$3,500?

Of course not. You can make that award. This case

is larger than that. Storix had much more to lose than \$3,500.

We all recall in opening statements

Mr. King bringing up Office Space, our good friend

Milton with his red stapler. Milton was the poor

abused employee of Initech, relegated to the

basement. He was fixated on his red stapler. He

had an unhealthy obsession with it, so much so that

when it was taken from him, he decided to burn down

the company.

Mr. Johnson has his own red stapler,

SB Admin. And I'll give you Milton was mistreated

at his job. Did we see any evidence that

Mr. Johnson was treated the way Milton was? Only in

his mind. Storix should not have to have weighted

for Mr. Johnson to succeed in burning it down before

taking steps necessary to pursue protecting its

interests.

Mr. King and Mr. Johnson may not like what consequences follow for Mr. Johnson's acts under the law, but their lights or dislikes are irrelevant. Your job will be to follow the law as the judge instructs you. If you do so, you will see why this case is about much more than \$3,500. Don't judge him, Mr. King says. Don't look at what he wrote.

I ask you to judge him on his acts. That is what the law would require. Actions have consequences. That is the message we ask you to

send. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. King, closing rebuttal argument on behalf of Mr. Johnson?

MR. KING: My dad used to tell me -- he'd say, "If you're accused of something, don't respond by telling the person who's accusing you that they did something else bad."

Mr. McCloskey, in his -- his statement, spent a significant amount of time talking about all the things that Johnson did after he was betrayed, after he was denied any role in the company. And that's telling, right?

How much time did Mr. McCloskey spend on attacking whether or not these cross-defendants breached their duty as majority controlling shareholders to the person who gave them the stock, the minority shareholder who came back to the business and expected to be treated fairly? How much time did he spend instead talking about how mad Mr. Johnson got, how crazy this whole thing had been blown up into? Why? Why would he spend all that time talking about that?

Mr. McCloskey did have some things to say in direct response to the wrongs that happened to Mr. Johnson before July 15, 2014. He had a few things. Mostly, it was after that. But let's look at the stuff he did say.

He said that this was not a gift and we

required a two-year commitment and Mr. Huffman put his education on hold, was ready to go back to school, but, you know, he said, All right. I will stay and do this two years. So it's not a gift.

Okay. I understand. Mr. Huffman decided not to go back to school. What Mr. McCloskey neglects to point out is what Mr. Huffman also received as a shareholder. For two years, about 20 percent of a million dollars in profits. You'll see it. When you go back in the jury room, there's the evidence of the annual reports. You can go right into it and see exactly how much everyone got as distributions.

Sixty percent of a million dollars in profit is what Mr. Johnson gave up. Sixty percent of a million dollars in profit is what cross-defendants got. That -- Mr. Johnson didn't need to force anyone to stay. They wanted that and that's fine. That's what Mr. Johnson wanted.

But to say that Mr. Huffman had to give up his education just to stay and take care of the company, that's not true. He was well compensated. There's plenty of reason why every single one of them wanted the stock and wanted to stay. It's making money. Who wouldn't want it?

What they didn't want, though, was they didn't want to be partners with the person who invited them to be partners with him. Well, if that

happens, someone invites you to be their business partner and you don't like them, well, you have a choice. You can say, "I don't want to be your business partner because I don't like. I don't get along with you. You're just -- you're weird. I don't want to work with you." So you don't go into partnership with them.

If you accept their invitation, you become their business partner and you work with them and you have an obligation that partners have when they take -- when they undertake an enterprise together to work together in good faith and trust each other. They wanted stock. They didn't want Johnson.

Now, Mr. McCloskey says that we're trying to enforce an agreement for \$50,000 for life. And again, I don't want you to be confused on this.

We -- Mr. Johnson is not saying that they have promised to pay him \$50,000 for life and they breached that promise and he's entitled -- no.

We're saying this: He had a reasonable expectation as a business partner, as a software developer. If he were to recover and come back to the company, he had every expectation that he would have a role in working at the company.

Now, yes, you saw the testimony. He did resign in May of 2014. And honestly, it sounded like he was -- you know, it sounded like there was some issues there, but he did. But when he asks to

come back, which again, everyone says, "Welcome back. You're a great programmer. You're the most--skilled programmer in the world," what's the response? No.

We're saying Mr. Johnson had an expectation he was going to have a position at the company if he wanted it. He wanted it. They said no. Now, Mr. McCloskey's comment on that was, There's no evidence of these phone conversations.

There's actually more evidence than I thought we'd get in the trial of those phone conversations. There are -- these are, again, the phone conversations Mr. Johnson, Anthony, was having with Mr. Altamirano in June -- late June and July 2014.

Again, he was not saying in these phone conversations, "I demand all these conditions. I'm not coming back unless this, this, and this." No. He's saying yes, probably ranting a little bit, probably getting some stuff off his chest, talking to someone he trusts, one of his partners. And he's saying, Hey, talk to these other guys. Let's sit down and see if we can work it out.

Sounds like a pretty reasonable thing to say. And I don't think Mr. Altamirano disputed any of that. Anthony says, On July 15th,
Mr. Altamirano, in a conversation with me, told me that I wasn't welcome back. They're not willing to

sit down and talk with you [sic] about it.

Maybe I was watching a different

Mr. Altamirano testify in this trial, but I heard
him testify. You heard him testify. He was clear
as day that maybe he didn't use the words, "You're
not welcome back," but that was the message.

Anthony needs to move on. Anthony's not the right
fit here. Whatever the -- whatever the words were
that he used, the message was clear. I got it.

Everyone got it. You're not welcome back.

Now, up to that point, Anthony had never said, "I'm going to sue you all for the copyright unless you meet all these conditions." In fact, you go in the exhibit room and you'll see Exhibit 338.

Okay. The first time -- he says the first time I'm mentioning the copyright claim is July 16th. That's the first mention of it after you've been told your out. You're not coming back.

Why \$50,000 a year? I think that's probably where the confusion is. That's what he asked for. So it seems natural that he might be saying there's a breach of and agreement, and we really should be suing Storix for this employment agreement. No. The defendants breached their agreement -- their obligation -- sorry -- as controlling shareholders in a business.

And their -- they have a fiduciary obligation to treat a minority shareholder fairly

and justly, equitably. By keeping Mr. Johnson out of the company by denying him a position, they breached that obligation.

Now, why \$50,000? Honestly, if Mr. Johnson were expect -- to go back, he probably expects a higher wage. The reason we chose \$50,000 -- the reason I'm requesting \$50,000 here is because that's what they agreed to when Mr. Johnson had to do nothing. So at a minimum, the reasonable expectation he had was what they agreed to when he left and he had to do nothing. That's what he lost.

Now, the damage was not caused by an employer turning an employment relationship or -it's caused by his business partner saying, You're
out. It's caused by his business partner saying,
You don't have a role in this company anymore. You
can have three minutes on a meeting, and that's it.
And you can get the checks that we send to you, but
you don't have any role. You don't have any
interest in -- you don't get salary. You don't get
any role in developing the software. That's it.
You're out. That's the breach.

Mr. McCloskey talked about Mr. Walt's testimony. He said it was unrebutted. Mr. Walt is an attorney, just like Mr. McCloskey. Mr. Walt is an attorney, but he's acting as an expert witness. So he's going to get up there and he's going to do his job as -- for the people who hired him as an

expert witness.

So I have -- I'm not surprised that when you hire an attorney to take your case, say things to help you out, the attorney's goes to say things in your favor. And he said -- Mr. McCloskey said these guys didn't breach any of their duties as directors or as officers.

But pay closer attention to what Mr. Walt didn't testify to. Did you hear Mr. Walt testify that these gentlemen did not breach their duties as majority shareholders? No. Did you hear Mr. Walt testify when I asked him, "What's Mr. Johnson's remedy if these guys treat him unfairly, if these guys, the day after the trial's over, dilute the shares of stock, put Mr. Johnson down to 1 percent and keep their percentage and continue running the company as it was?"

He's -- he said his remedy is a breach of fiduciary duty against the majority shareholders for abusing their control. That's what this lawsuit is about. But he didn't testify that these guys didn't breach that duty. Why not? If that were my expert in this case, that would be the first thing he'd testified to, but he didn't.

Talked about this buy-sell agreement.

Again, it's so confusing. It's frustrating, but I
think you guys get it. I'm not going to belabor it,
but there was no original buy-sell agreement. The

point is not a buy-sell agreement was concealed or not produced. They concealed the efforts to go pursue one and have one put in place from Mr. Johnson, who's sitting right there. That's what they concealed. They concealed it from their business partner, those efforts to get that in place.

When you go back there and deliberate, the judge is going to instruct you and you're going to have a bunch of exhibits. And you're probably going to get up, get out the door really quick, and you probably know what you're already going to do. I would urge you to take -- pay close attention to all of the exhibits. Read them all.

If you have any concern about the testimony, what the testimony was, you can ask the court reporter to come in, provide you -- provide you that testimony. If you have any question, direct it to the judge and the judge will deal with that. I urge you to be thorough. I urge you to consider all the facts in this case, everything that happened. Thank you. I have nothing further.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen let's take another recess. If we can try to keep this one to about ten minutes, that would be great and remember the admonition. See you back in about ten minutes.

(Whereupon jury instructions were given and reported but not requested in the transcript on

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     appeal.)
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               (Jury deliberates.)
 3
            (The proceedings concluded at 4:20 p.m.)
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1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
2	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO)
3	
4	I, Leyla S. Jones, a Certified Shorthand
5	Reporter, do hereby certify:
6	That prior to being examined, the witness
7	in the foregoing proceedings was by me duly sworn to
8	testify to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
9	but the truth;
10	That said proceedings were taken before me
11	at the time and place therein set forth and were
12	taken down by me in shorthand and thereafter
13	transcribed into typewriting under my direction and
14	supervision;
15	I further certify that I am neither counsel
16	for, nor related to, any party to said proceedings,
17	nor in any way interested in the outcome thereof.
18	In witness whereof, I have hereunto
19	subscribed my name.
20	
21	Dated: June 16, 2019
22	
23	Levia S. Jones
24	CSR No. 12750
25	
26	